FIRST SERIES, No. 22 NOVEMBER, 1918 



d 383 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA 

STUDIES 



STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 

VOLUME VII NUMBER 1 



The Diplomatic Relations 
of England with the 
Quadruple Alliance 1815-1830 



BY 

Myrna Boyce 



PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY, IOWA CITY 



Issued monthly throughout the year. Entered at the postoffice at Iowa Citv, Iowa, as second class matter. Acceptance 
for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on July 3, 1918. 



UNIVERSITY OF IOWA STUDIES 




STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 



F. E. Haynes, Ph.D., Editor 

. c 

VOLUME VII NUMBER 1 



The Diplomatic Relations 
of England with the 
Quadruple Alliance 1815-1830 



BY 

Myrna Boyce 



PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY, IOWA CITY 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 

I England's Entrance into the Quadruple Alliance 5 

II The General Policy of Castlereagh and Canning 

toward the interpretation of the quadruple 

Alliance 13 

III The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle . . .19 

IV The Congress of Troppau 36 

V The Congress at Laibach 45 

VI The Congress of Verona 51 

VII The Economic Basis of the English Diplomacy 

in the Congress 61 

VIII Summary 73 

Bibliography 76 



CHAPTER I 

ENGLAND'S ENTRANCE INTO THE QUADRUPLE 
ALLIANCE 1815-1830 

With the overthrow of Napoleon the victors of France were 
confronted with the task of reconstructing the map of Europe 
and of restoring peace and order. For this purpose the Con- 
gress of Vienna was assembled, and a year later the Quadruple 
Alliance was formed, destined to become the most power- 
ful concert of powers ever maintained in time of peace. A 
discussion of the origin, character, purposes, and justification 
of such a union arouses numerous questions that demand con- 
sideration and solution. 

Was this dominating alliance, this strong concert of England, 
Austria, Russia, and Prussia, in the period from 1815 to 
1830, necessary to the reconstruction of Europe following the 
Napoleonic regime? Was it an acknowledgment of the failure 
of the Congress of Vienna to establish order and the regard 
of one nation for another's rights? Was this Alliance, then, 
a logical outgrowth of the Vienna conferences, or was its need 
foreseen in the dreary days of desolation, and its form gradually 
evolved? Was it a great machine of repression or instrument 
of war projected into time of peace? Did England see in such 
an alliance a noble means of guiding aright an erring nation? 
Was she actuated by selfish motives in casting aside the policy 
of Pitt, the policy of non-interference, or was she forced to a 
realization that what concerned Europe was of consequence 
to England, that she could no longer be a self-sufficing na- 
tional unit? For forty years following the Second Treaty of 
Paris, the peace of Europe was steadfastly maintained with- 
out a single encounter between any of the powers. Is this 
a justification for the reactionary character of the alliance? 

In order to answer these questions and to understand the 
origin of the Alliance together with the work confronting it, 

5 



6 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

the work left undone by the Congress of Vienna, its short- 
comings or failures, should be passed in brief review. 

In that assembly of crowned heads and dictating diplomat- 
ists, powerful though the Czar Alexander and Prince Metter- 
nich were, the responsibility of adjusting the infinite disputes 
should necessarily have fallen to England, that mistress of the 
seas who overwhelmed Napoleon's schemes for Africa and 
Asia; it was English money subsidizing the armies of Austria 
and Russia which enabled them to continue in the field; it 
was England's army, finally, and England's general that con- 
quered the European foe. Moreover, England, alone among the 
powers against France, because of her geographical location 
and her general foreign relations could have been a disinter- 
ested force and an equitable judge in deciding upon conti- 
nental readjustments. Furthermore, the English people, 
among whom for the decade past there had been developing a 
moral sense as a nation, a comprehension that out of the 
French Revolution there had emerged certain rights of man, 
expected and rightfully demanded that the settlement of Eu- 
rope be made upon a higher basis than the principle of legiti- 
macy, that it be founded upon a higher moral law. Lord 
Castlereagh himself recognized this new attitude not only of 
England but of Europe. In a letter written in May, 1814, to 
Lord Bentinck he said, "It is impossible not to perceive a 
great moral change coming on in Europe, and that the prin- 
ciples of freedom are in full operation. The danger is, that 
the transition may be too sudden to ripen into anything likely 
to make the world better or happier." 1 Lord Castlereagh, 
then, was not oblivious to this change, but as a reactionary 
failed to respond to the awakened era. And so in the Con- 
gress, England was content to take an inferior part, to per- 
mit Metternich, "that mind which never erred," to be the 
dominating personality. 

Surely there was in the Polish question a right to be up- 
held and a principle of justice upon which to act. But in 
this the opportunity for England to interfere was allowed to 
pass by. 

"Up to the period of the Congress of Vienna, no British 

1 Castlereagh, Correspondence X, p. 18 (Castlereagh to Lord Wm. Bentinck). 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 7 

statesman had ever set his hand to an instrument, acknowledg- 
ing as valid acts, the two partitions of Poland. Had the 
British plenipotentiary founded his objections upon this prin- 
ciple, had he positively refused to commit his Government to 
any such acknowledgement, and had he insisted on the erec- 
tion of an independent Polish state, he would have been ap- 
plauded by the whole of Europe, whilst Austria and Prussia 
would not only have not opposed it, but, on the contrary, 
would have acquiesced in it with pleasure. ' ' 2 

"Backed by such powerful support, as well as by the voice 
of public opinion throughout Europe, it is more than probable 
that he (Castlereagh) might have been successful, but the mo- 
ment when he gave up the principle, and told the emperor 
that he was not indisposed to witness even with satisfaction 
that his Imperial Majesty should receive a liberal and important 
aggrandizement on his Polish frontier, and that it was to the 
degree and the mode to which he alone objected, he threw away 
the only weapon which he could successfully wield. ' ' 3 That 
Lord Castlereagh was not taking this moral stand was felt 
by the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Cook. He ex- 
horted his superior to fling aside the treaties and "to declare 
that nothing should induce Great Britain to acknowledge the 
validity of those acts. ' ' 4 

Again England failed to appreciate an ideal for which she 
had been fighting, the building up of British Empire. It is 
true that in the Congress and in the Treaty of Paris, England 
made important acquisitions, and certainly expanded very ma- 
terially in her colonial possessions, keeping islands of no con- 
sequence to the imperial ideal. It was merely acquisitions of 
land regardless of its use to England. That not even Liver- 
pool was alive to the colonial situation is clear from the fol- 
lowing extract from a letter to Castlereagh: "We have Guada- 
loupe and the Saintes in our hands, which have in fact been 
conquered. We have no desire for any more colonies, but it 
may not be amiss to consider them as fair pledges for the just 
claims of our own subjects." 5 

2 Stapleton, George Canning and his Times, p. 354. 

3 Stapleton, George Canning and his Times, p 354. 

4 Ibid, p 356. 

5 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XI, p. 48, (Liverpool to Castlereagh, Oct. 5, 1915). 



8 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

Then, too, in the Eastern question, concerning the unrest 
of the Balkan states, England could without doubt have used 
her influence to allay discord, indeed even to settle definitely 
the position and rights of those states in Europe. Austria did 
not dare broach the subject, nor did Russia question it. It 
was England's part, a responsibility she should have taken 
upon herself. 

Again, in the question of the slave trade, the Congress of 
Vienna failed to respond to the demands of the reform party 
of England. Castlereagh appeared satisfied to receive a gen- 
eral declaration of the powers against it, 

Following the Congress of Vienna, treaties between the 
powers were made with the idea of supporting the work of 
Vienna. The Treaty of Chaumont was entered into in the 
spring of 1815, and in the November following the second 
treaty of Paris was concluded. It confirmed the work of the 
Congress with its glaring defects. To the potentates of its 
making, it was obvious enough that a means of enforcing the 
terms and of maintaining the status of things as therein pro- 
vided would be necessary. That instrument proved to be an 
alliance. The Congress of Vienna, therefore, was directly re- 
sponsible for a continued union of powers. 

But even before the treaty, there had been expressed opinions 
concerning concord of action for the maintenance of peace, 
and the repression of revolutionary development. 6 As early as 
1800 this note appeared in the Parliamentary Debates: 

" . . . In order to render this security as complete as pos- 
sible it seems necessary at the period of a general pacification 
to form a treaty to which all the principal powers of Europe 
should be partners, by which their respective rights and pos- 
sessions, as they shall then have been established, shall be fixed 
and recognized; and they should all bind themselves mutually 
to protect and support each other against any attempt to in- 
fringe them. It should reestablish a general and comprehen- 
sive system of public law in Europe, provide as far as possible 
for repressing future attempts to disturb general tranquility, 
and, above all, for restraining any projects of aggrandize- 
ment and the ambition similar to those which have produced all 

6 Hansard, Debates, XXL, p. 182. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 9 

the calamities inflicted on Europe since the disastrous war 
of the French Revolution. ' ' 7 

Castlereagh in his desire and plan for an alliance to se- 
cure the future peace of Europe showed himself magnanimous, 
a statesman, having at heart the interests not only of England, 
but also the welfare of the continent. He made the statement : 

"It is the province of Great Britain to turn the confidence 
she has inspired to the account of peace, by exercising a con- 
ciliatory influence between the Powers, rather than put her- 
self at the head of any combination of Courts to keep others 
in check. . . The immediate object to be kept in view is to 
inspire the states of Europe, as long as we can, with a sense 
of the dangers which they have surmounted by their union, 
of the hazards they will incur by a relaxation of vigilance, to 
make them feel that the existing concert is their only perfect 
security against the revolutionary embers more or less ex- 
isting in every state of Europe. ' ' 8 

Before the definitive Treaty of Paris was signed, the sov- 
ereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, in person, became 
parties to a solemn compact, the Holy Alliance, formulated in 
September, 1815. To this document England never signed 
her name, allied though she had been with these nations through 
the Napoleonic Wars, and at the time of its promulgation uni- 
ted with them in the occupation of France. It was declared 
that the articles, "in consequence of the great events which 
have marked the course of the three last years in Europe, and 
especially of the blessings which it has pleased Divine Provi- 
dence to shower down upon those states which place their con- 
fidence and hope in it alone (their majesties) acquired the 
intimate conviction of the necessity of founding the conduct 
to be observed by the powers in their reciprocal relations upon 
the sublime truths which the Holy religion of our Savior 
teaches. " 9 In this holy union it was further decreed, ' ' the 
three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds 
of a true and indissoluble fraternity and considering each other 
as fellow country men, they will on all occasions and in all 
places, lend each other aid and assistance and regarding them- 

7 Hansard, Debates, XXL, p. 172. 

8 Castlereagh, Correspondence XI, p. 105, (Castlereagh to Mr. Rose, Dec. 28, 1815). 

9 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, I p. 317. 



10 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

selves as fathers of families, they will lead them in the same 
spirit of fraternity with which they are animated to protect 
religion, peace, and justice. 

"In consequence, the sole purpose in force shall be that of 
doing each other reciprocal service. ' ' 10 

Why such an alliance should be formed to the exclusion of 
England was perplexing and irritating to the English House 
of Commons, chiefly to the Whigs. Why the three Powers 
which had entered into a treaty with England, pledging all 
the contracting parties to an identity of interest and object, 
should have entered into a triple alliance, why its sole nego- 
tiation and signing had taken place outside the usual medium 
of diplomacy, and what its real purposes were, were problems 
exciting the suspicion of England. 11 

Mr. Brougham in his attack in the House on the unusual 
manner in which it had been drawn up, and on the character 
of its terms, demanded from Lord Castlereagh the reason for 
England's exclusion and the necessity of the Powers entering 
the solemn pledge. Such a treaty, unheard of in history since 
the crusades, an unthinkable product of modern Europe, gave 
rise to unwarranted alarm, bitter jealousy, and prophecies of 
despotism based upon false analogies. "When crowned heads 
met," it was declared, "the result of their united councils was 
not always favorable to the interests of humanity." 12 The 
war against Poland had been prefaced by a proclamation in 
similar language to that which this treaty contained. Castle- 
reagh in reply to the opposition stated that the sovereigns had 
addressed a join letter to the Prince Regent inviting him into 
the Holy Alliance, but although the latter approved highly of 
its terms, he was unable to become a party, as the laws of 
England did not permit such a procedure. 

Two months after the formation of the Holy Alliance, the 
Quadruple Alliance was formed. To this England became a 
party. This compact, providing for the employment of means 
to maintain the peace of Europe, binding the contracting par- 
ties to aid each other against all attempts to disturb the es- 
ablished succession, providing for meetings of the allies from 

10 Hansard, Debates, 11, p. 354. 
li Ibid, 11, 359. 
12 Ibid, 11, 359. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 11 

time to time to arrange difficulties which might arise, and to 
discuss and settle any differences occurring between any two 
powers, has often been confused with the Holy Alliance. 13 
In reality in the minds of the statesmen of the period there 
appears to have been no distinction. In the correspondence 
of Canning and Wellington and in the memoirs of Gentz, the 
expressions "Holy Alliance" and "Quadruple Alliance" are 
used synonymously. 

Modern historians make much of the point that the Holy 
Alliance was from its inception a dead letter, 14 and maintain 
that it was the Quadruple Alliance, or the Pentarchy (as it 
was sometimes called after the admission of France to its 
councils) which became an influence in European affairs. That 
the congresses were called in accordance with the provisions 
of the Quadruple Alliance is unquestioned, but whether the 
two alliances were ever considered by their authors as distinct 
or unrelated raises a point. 

Josceline Bagot, in his life of Canning, declares: "By the 
treaty drawn up in November, the five Powers or the Pentarchy, 
pledged themselves to act in concord for the maintenance of 
the European peace. There is a clear distinction between this 
committee and what is known as the Holy Alliance, although the 
policy to be pursued has been generally known as that of the 
Alliance only." Bagot, himself, however, has failed to main- 
tain the distinction. He writes: "Whether the attitude of 
Great Britain which finally disconcerted the Holy Alliance and 
made for liberal government of Europe, ' ' 15 whereas in the 
following statement of Gentz, he recognizes no distinction: 
"Now, this truly sacred union, of which the Holy Alliance is 
but an imperfect symbol, was never manifested in a more 
reassuring manner than at the time of the conference at Aix- 
la-Chapelle. " 16 Greville in his Memoirs makes the statement, 
"While Lord Castlereagh was obliged to pretend to disapprove 
of the Continental System of the Holy Alliance. . . ." 17 
In like manner, recognizing the alliances as one and the same 

13 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, 1, p. 372. 

14 Hazen, Europe Since 1815, p. 16. 

15 Bagot, George Canning and his Times, I, p. 118. 

16 Metternich, Autobiography, III, p. 194. 

17 Greville, Memoirs, I, p. 107. 



12 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

thing, Wellington in 1824 wrote, "Although, therefore, the 
Holy Alliance, properly so called, would be applicable to trans- 
actions with the Porte, the system of the Holy Alliance sup- 
posed to be established by the treaties of Paris and Aix-la- 
Chapelle, was never considered applicable to those transac- 
tions. ' ' 18 Canning, in response to a call for a conference on 
the Greek and Turkish situation declared, "I will not be re- 
plunged into what is vulgarly called the "Holy Alliance." ™ 

Whether the alliance which became the active force in Eu- 
ropean affairs be called the Holy Alliance, the Moral Pentarchy, 
or the Quadruple Alliance, England was a member for very 
definite reasons. First, the doubtful tranquillity of Europe, 
England's long alliance with the Powers, and her temporary 
occupation of France, were powerful influences impelling her to 
remain an ally against France. In the second place, she was 
actuated by an active purpose. "To carry into execution not 
only the maintenance of the treaties of peace connected with 
the settlement of Europe (just then concluded) but also for 
the purpose of controlling the ambition and jealousies of the 
great Allied Powers themselves in relation to each other. ' ' 20 

England, at the time of her entrance into the Alliance, may 
have foreseen a divergence of opinion respecting the interpreta- 
tion of the duties of the allies as provided in the treaty, and 
may have anticipated the impossibility of acting in harmony 
with her allies. And yet by the pressure of existing conditions, 
she had of necessity to become a participant in European af- 
fairs, not definitely changing her former policy of isolation 
but temporarily suspending it. 



18 Wellington, Correspondence, II, p. 360, (Wellington to Canning). 

19 Bagot, Canning, II, p. 313. 

20 Wellington, Correspondence, II, p. 402, (The King to Liverpool, Jan. 27, 1864). 



CHAPTER II 

THE GENERAL POLICY OF CASTLEREAGH AND 

CANNING TOWARD THE INTERPRETATION 

OF THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 

Diplomatic transactions are always to a greater or less de- 
gree veiled in obscurity; they are always in large part hidden 
records of history, ciphers to which time and chance may fur- 
nish the key. Features of greatest importance are purposely 
omitted ; motives, fears, and prophecies in the recorded volumes 
of diplomatic papers have no place, and in their stead, gen- 
eralizations, summaries, and memorials fill the pages. The re- 
sults of conferences, the conclusion of long and heated de- 
bates, of differences tending either toward war or peace, ap- 
pear; but the arguments pro and con upon courses of action 
eventually determined, the significant conversations among dip- 
lomatists carried on outside the regular conference hall, the 
dinners at which intrigues are inaugurated, fathomed or ad- 
justed — in diplomatic correspondence, all of these have no 
recognition. They are the omitted chapters. The necessity 
of an envoy sparing the feelings of a colleague or of hiding 
the mistakes of a home minister imposes a silence which is 
often misconstrued. Upon the construction placed upon these 
incomplete records and the surmises and suspicions they arouse, 
is based the public condemnation or justification of ministers 
and nations. 

Lord Castlereagh in the period before the Congress of Vien- 
na, like most European ministers in that era of revolutionary 
ideas and excesses, was so strongly conservative as to be re- 
actionary; and although his attitude following 1818 became 
more liberal, and his policy, one of non-acquiesence in the 
policy of restriction supported by his allies, he was condemned 
by his contemporaries and has been blamed by historians since, 
for his adherence to the system of repression. To Englishmen 

13 



14 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

dissatisfied with the outcome of Vienna, and alarmed by the 
assumptions of the Holy Alliance and by the coalition of the 
four great Powers in time of peace, it was self evident that 
Castlereagh upheld the entire continental policy. His former 
actions confirmed them in the opinion, and the courtesy with 
which he spoke of the allies in public seemed further proof 
of his agreement with the Powers. It is with difficulty that 
a man can again secure confidence when his past acts have once 
condemned him. So it was with Castlereagh. Until recently, 
the blame of the English support of the Quadruple Alliance 
has fallen upon him, and the glory of disconcerting that council 
has redounded to Canning alone. 

That Castlereagh pursued the policy which he truly felt to 
be of advantage to England is more credible today, as we 
view in retrospect the period from 1814 to 1822, the time during 
which, as foreign minister, he practically dictated foreign poli- 
cy. His policy of repression as indicated in a note in Decem- 
ber 1815, is but the expression of a natural fear. 

In regard to the liberal movement in Prussia, he said that 
he felt great anxiety and that it was impossible to foretell to 
what end the new ideas of government and revolutionary ten- 
dencies there prevalent would be carried. 1 His distrust of the 
revolutionary principles was often voiced in his letters to Eng- 
lish representatives abroad. He saw new constitutions launched 
in France, Spain, Holland, and Sicily, and was of the con- 
servative opinion that such attempts at republican government 
should not be encouraged, and that it was the duty of England 
to retard rather than to accelerate the new principles. 2 Al- 
though fearing the results of sudden revolutionary outbursts, 
and proclaiming it to be "true wisdom to keep down the 
petty contentions of ordinary times, and to stand together in 
support of the established principles of social order, ' ' 3 Castle- 
reagh did not necessarily approve of England's entering into 
congresses with Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to which all in- 
ternal affairs of the smaller countries were to be subjected. 
Against such a policy of interference he wrote: 

"It is not my wish to encourage, on the part of this country, 

1 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XI, p. 106, (Castlereagh to Mr. Rose). 

2 Ibid, X, p. 15, (Castlereagh to Bentinck, May 7, 1814). 

3 Ibid, p. 105, (Castlereagh to Mr. Rose). 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 15 

an unnecessary interference in the ordinary affairs of the 
Continent. The interposition of Great Britain will always 
be most authoritative in proportion as it is not compromised 
by being unduly mixed in the daily concerns of these states. ' ' 4 

Castlereagh 's concurrence in the Quadruple Alliance can- 
not be taken as absolute approval of the Metternich system. 
At its inception he could see an advantage in giving England 
some voice in the European conferences. Would not her in- 
terests have suffered without any representative to present her 
views? The divergence of opinion which showed itself in 1815 
became wider with the calling of each congress. At Aix-la- 
Chapelle, Castlereagh opposed the prevailing sentiment; at 
Troppeau and at Laibach, he objected to the presence of Eng- 
lish representatives, lest he be accused of acquiescing in the 
European policy. The instructions he drew up for the Con- 
gress of Vienna were to the effect that England must not 
join in the policy of the Quadruple Alliance. 5 The break with 
the Alliance, then, was not to take place with the death of 
Castlereagh. It should not be construed purely as the new 
policy of a new minister. 

Metternich 's esteem for Castlereagh has been employed by 
critics of the latter to show that he must have been in the con- 
fidence of Metternich and that he approved of the Prince's 
policy of interference. Metternich had met Castlereagh in 1814 
at Basel and there he "had laid the foundations of a good feel- 
ing." 6 It has been supposed that there had been some under- 
standing between them previous to the congress of Verona, for 
otherwise he would not have expressed the hope that Castle- 
reagh would be the English representative, and have written, 
' ' I awaited him here as my second self. ' ' 7 

Although the correspondence would not support the state- 
ment that Castlereagh upheld the method of what is known 
as the Metternich system, and although Castlereagh 's communi- 
cations to the House of Commons do not sustain the alliance 
in the broader powers it assumed, opponents have, nevertheless, 
suspected him of secret agreement with Metternich. Greville 
in his Memoirs claims that, "While Castlereagh was obliged to 

4 Ibid, p. 107. 

5 Bagot, Canning, II, p. 143. 

6 Ibid, p. 144. 

7 Metternich, Autobiography , III, p. 591. 



16 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

pretend to disapprove of the continental Alliance, he secretly 
gave to Metternich every assurance of his private concurrence, 
and it was not till long after Canning's accession that Metter- 
nich could be persuaded of his sincerity in opposing their views, 
always fancying that he was obliged to act a part as his prede- 
cessors had done to keep the House of Commons quiet. ' ' 8 This 
secret agreement, if such existed, is the closed chapter in Castle- 
reagh's relations with Metternich and the Quadruple Alliance. 
It is not to be found in the diplomatic correspondence of Castle- 
reagh himself or in the correspondence of Metternich that is 
available. The question, therefore, as to the duplicity of Castle- 
reagh in his relations to Parliament, and the question as to his 
part in the disruption of the Alliance are unanswered, and his 
condemnation or praise will rest with his adherents or op- 
ponents. 

With the diplomatic correspondence as evidence, it must hon- 
estly be acknowledged by the supporters of either Castlereagh 
or Canning that neither countenanced the Quadruple Alliance 
in its more fully developed policies. But to Canning must be 
accredited greater rigor, more effective opposition in contro- 
verting the tendencies of the other Powers. Castlereagh 's stand 
was one of non-agreement with their policies. It was negative. 
Canning's objections, on the other hand, his declarations of the 
policy of England, were the course of active resistance. 

In the settlement of Vienna, Canning had no part, nor was 
it concluded on principles, upon which he approved. ' ' But from 
the time when they were signed to the end of his life, he al- 
ways held the provisions were to be accepted as inviolable by 
England. ' ' 9 The Alliance, the means decided upon to maintain 
the peace, Canning recognized. It was the extent of its power 
to which he took exception. 

Canning was not a lover of revolution. On the contrary, he 
passed "nearly thirty years of his life fighting for old institu- 
tions, ' ' 10 in the House of Commons, but he could not, as he 
himself states, "shut my eyes to the real state of things." 11 

The glory of England, its prestige on the continent and 
throughout the whole world, were ever before Canning in his 

8 Greville, Memoirs, I, p. 107. 

9 Stapleton, Canning, p. 352. 

10 Ibid, p. 380-381, (Canning to H. WeUesley, Sept. 16, 1823). 
li Ibid. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 17 

relations with Europe. His policy was apparently more sel- 
fish than that of Castlereagh. "England has not only to main- 
tain herself on the basis of her own solid foundation and settled 
constitution, firm, unshaken, a spectress interested in the con- 
test only by her sympathies, not a partisan on either side, but 
for the sake of both, a model and ultimately perhaps an um- 
pire. " 12 

His hope for a greater England appeared in numerous 
speeches and letters. At Plymouth in 1823, he outlined the 
policy he intended to pursue, and made the statement, "For 
Europe he would be desirous, now and then, to read England. ' ' 13 

It was not to the Alliance that Canning objected but to the 
Congresses. "No more Congresses, thank God," he exclaimed 
shortly before taking office. He was of the opinion that the 
allies had no right to demand aid for interference in the na- 
tional affairs of a state, but that it was England's place to 
check aggression and to maintain the balance of power in Eu- 
rope. 15 To Metternich, Canning's policy was unintelligible. 
Why, he wondered, did not Canning withdraw altogether from 
the Alliance, since he opposed its methods? In 1823 he wrote, 
"When, then, does Canning want? Whose part will he take? 
What is he about? For after all, a man must have some object 
or end in view. I really begin to lose the very small portion of 
respect I had (not without difficulty, God forgive me) attained 
for the man. ' ' 16 

It is not surprising that Metternich was unable to determine 
Canning's intentions, when the many instances of misunder- 
standing between them are recalled. Even to the members of 
his own foreign service Canning's motives were not clear. David 
Montague Erskine, the minister to the United States in 1809 
failed to understand his purposes. The American minister to 
England during the same period, was likewise misled by his 
statements. Henry Adams declares that Canning's policies do 
not admit of understanding, and in speaking of his policy to- 
ward American embargo, he states, "Yet motives were enigmas 
too obscure for search, and the motives of Canning in this in- 
stance were more perplexing than usual." 17 

12 Ibid, p. 368, Canning's speech, August 30, 1822, at Liverpool. 

13 Ibid, p. 364, Canning to Sir Charles Bagot. 

15 Ibid., p. 376, (Stapleton to Canning), (Canning to Wellesley). 

16 Metternich, Autobiography, IV, p. 8-9. 

17 Adams, History of the United States, V, p. 54. 



18 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

To the continental Powers to whom the responsibility of a 
minister to a Parliament was beyond comprehension, the refusal 
of Canning to act in concord could only be construed as the 
policy of the minister alone. The contention that the demands 
of Parliament were being fulfilled by Canning's position or that 
acquiesence in the policy desired by the Powers would meet with 
the disapproval of the House of Commons, was looked upon 
by Metternich as a mere excuse. He believed that its opinions, 
if adverse, might be overruled. Until 1823 he labored under the 
delusion that the English foreign ministers secretly agreed to 
measures which officially they denied, and that their real policies 
were not represented by their language in Parliament. "It is 
as essential a part of the national council," Canning wrote to 
Henry Wellesley, "and woe to the ministers who should under- 
take to conduct the affairs of this country upon the principle of 
settling the course of its foreign policy with a Grand Alliance, 
and should rely upon carrying their decisions into effect by 
throwing a little dust in the eyes of the House of Commons." 18 
Canning repeatedly insisted that the English ministers abroad 
should make it clear to the allies that when differences arose in 
the foreign relations, they must not be viewed as a "feint to 
avoid conflict with public opinion. ' ' 19 His policy, Canning 
wished it understood, was one of conviction and not one to meet 
the parliamentary exigencies of the time. 20 Metternich 's in- 
ability to influence Canning or to shake him from a determined 
policy led him to write that England had entered upon a false 
and dangerous liberalism, and that Canning was certainly "a 
very awkward opponent." 

"With this lack of sympathy between Canning and Metter- 
nich, with a misunderstanding of the part that the English 
Parliament exercised in foreign relations, the congresses after 
Castlereagh seemed doomed to failure. The policy of Castle- 
reagh to refuse assent to the usurped power of the congresses, 
and to hold aloof in solitary opposition to the wish of the com- 
bined allies will doubtless be seen to foreshadow the breach of 
England with the Quadruple Alliance, a breach which culmin- 
ated under Canning. 

18 Stapleton, Canning, p. 378, (Canning to H. Wellesley). 

19 Bagot, Canning, Vol. II, p. 221, (Canning to Chas. Bagot). 

20 Ibid, p. 118. 



CHAPTER III 
THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 

The allied Powers, as a means of executing the work of the 
congress of Vienna and the Quadruple Alliance, agreed to unite 
from time to time in congress, "to arrange together any mat- 
ters of general interest which might arise and to settle and dis- 
cuss any differences which might occur between any two 
Powers. " 1 It was further stipulated that there should be no 
discussion of the affairs of any Power without the represen- 
tation of that country in the deliberation. In accordance with 
this general agreement, the sixth article of the Quadruple Alli- 
ance provided more specifically for the assembly of the sove- 
reigns. The purposes were stated, and the objects of the con- 
ferences were declared to be the "greatest common interest and 
the consideration of measures which would be the most bene- 
ficial to the peace and prosperity of the world. " 2 In Metter- 
nich 's opinion the terms imposed a duty upon the Powers which 
they were under obligation to perform : ' ' The five courts which 
were assembled at Aix, " he wrote, "are not only invited there, 
but by the treaty of November 20, 1815, they are bound to 
come." 3 

Accordingly, in the fall of 1818, the sovereigns of Russia, 
Austria, and Prussia, together with the Austrian diplomatists, 
Metternich, Vincent, and Gentz; the Russian, Capo d'Istria, 
Nesselrode and Lieven; the Prussian, Hardenberg, Humboldt, 
and Bernstoff; the English, Wellington and Castlereagh; and 
the French, Richelieu, Rayneval, and Mounier, met for their 
first congress. Preliminary to the meeting, petitions to the Eng- 
lish representatives requesting the consideration of certain meas- 
ures, expressions of opinion regarding the meeting, together 
with statements of the results expected from the congress, and 

1 Greville, Memoirs, II, p. 67. 

2 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, XII, p. 773. 

3 Metternich, Autobiography, III, p. 164. 

19 



20 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

the arranging of private interviews and meetings previous to 
the congress, were among the important preparations. They 
are of significance in reflecting the attitude which prevailed at 
the meeting, that of good will or reserved suspicion, and in por- 
tending points of disagreement, should wide discussion be per- 
mitted. 

The opening of the congress to the consideration of new ques- 
tions was looked upon by both England and Austria as dan- 
gerous. 4 Metternich and Castlereagh in the early part of Sep- 
tember concurred in the opinion that it would be unwise to 
permit miscellaneous discussion; to the discussion of Spanish 
affairs they were particularly opposed. France and Russia, 
on the other hand, seem to have been agreed as to the necessity 
of bringing the Spanish question before the Congress. The 
Emperor having heard the request of the Spanish charge d'- 
affaires at St. Petersburg for the admission of a Spanish minis- 
ter to the conference, referred the matter to France. France 
approved, and the attitude of these two Powers was made known 
to Castlereagh in August through private conversation with the 
Due de Richelieu and Pozzo di Borgo. Richelieu considered it 
necessary for the conference to take some step for mediation 
between Spain and her colonies. He proposed sending a mem- 
ber of a younger branch of the Spanish dynasty to be King of 
Buenos Ayres. Pozzo di Borgo was of the opinion that the 
Spanish king should be admitted to Aix-la-Chapelle as "the 
only mode of settling all Spanish questions. ' ' 5 

Against these proposals Castlereagh protested. His chief ar- 
guments were that if the King of Spain were admitted his min- 
isters also would have to attend, that inconveniences would pro- 
bably result and the whole work of the conference would be 
rendered impracticable; and that the other European nations 
though submitting to the dominion of the four Powers would 
resent the admittance of Spain to the councils. 6 The fear of 
the introduction of Spanish affairs appears to have been para- 
mount in the minds of the English. "I cannot conceive," 
'wrote Mr. Cook to Castlereagh, "that you would go further in 
mediation with Spain than good offices and possible guarantees, 

4 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, XII, p. 675, (Castlereagh to Metternich). 

5 Ibid, XII, p. 675, (Wellington to Castlereagh). 

6 Ibid, p. 665, (Wellington to Castlereagh). 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 21 

. . . . a mediation by arms is out of the question. ' ' 7 The 
Emperor of Russia, although he did not protest before the con- 
gress against wide discussion, was anxious to avoid embarrass- 
ing questions ; he suggested that the meeting should be brief as 
his early return to Russia was necessary. 8 

The situation was viewed as precarious. In August, Castle- 
reagh while in Paris heard it both rumored and openly stated 
that the meeting had been postponed until later in the fall, in 
order to give time for summoning the King of Spain. 9 Metter- 
nich, in the same month, learned that the approaching congress 
was looked upon by the Diet of Frankfurt with suspicion, and 
that "intriguers" were planning to carry measures to Aix-la- 
Chapelle ' ' to interrupt the progress of affairs. ' ' 10 Castlereagh 
received communication from the government suggesting the in- 
expediency of the Powers entering upon transatlantic and col- 
onial questions, 11 but later received a long petition from Mr. 
James Stephens,* suggesting African and colonial condition-'" 
which should have consideration in the congress. Reasons were 
given against the restoration of Haiti to France, both with re- 
gard to the welfare of Haiti and to the advantage of England. 
The demand for consideration of the abolition of slaves was 
made, and a statement of two important measures which should 
be put before the congress; first, whether France might not be 
reasonably invited to declare herself in regard to her views on 
St. Domingo, on account of their connections with the abolition 
of the slave trade and the peace of the Indies; second, whether 
if she meditate new expeditions the influence of Great Britain 
and other powers at the congress might not be properly em- 
ployed to induce her to desist from that purpose. 12 Not only 
was there a demand for the discussion of the slave situation in 
this particular case, but also a sentiment on the part of the 

7 Ibid. 

8 Ibid, XII, p. 678, (Wellington to Earl Bathurst). 
9. Ibid, p. 665, (Wellington to Castlereagh). 

10 Mettemich, Autobiography , III, p. 128. 

11 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XI, p. 473. 

* Mr. Stephens, a native of the West Indies, was sent to England at an early age 
to pursue the profession of the law. By means of a matrimonial alliance with the 
family of Mr. Wilberforce, he obtained a seat in Parliament, which he resigned on 
being appointed master in Chancery. 

12 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XI, p. 234, (Mr. Jas. Stephens to Castlereagh). 



22 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

English people for a declaration of the Powers against the 
slave trade. 

With these conditions confronting them at the opening of the 
congress, it was but natural that the confidence of one nation 
toward another should be strained. Castlereagh wrote: 

"I do not expect much good from Metternich's negotiation 
at Paris, and should not wish myself mixed in it. The less a 
British minister dabbles in Monsieur's politics, the better. 
Charles * will be of considerable use to me in keeping Metter- 
nich steady and apprising me of what he is about. ' ' 13 

By the Prime Minister little trust was placed in Emperor 
Alexander. Liverpool, in his correspondence with Castlereagh 
wrote : 

"I think you will find no difficulty in keeping the Emperor 
of Russia from coming in November; this visit might certainly 
lead to intrigues. ' ' 14 

By the time of the meeting, many of the suspicions and fears 
which the statesmen had harboured through the year 1817 and 
the summer of 1818 had disappeared. The sinister fear that 
the Emperor had contemplated an alliance with the Bourbons 
of France, Spain, and Italy, the belief on the part of Russia 
that there were secret negotiations between Great Britain and 
Austria, had in the main given way to a spirit of extreme cau- 
tion. 15 After the first few days of the congress, Castlereagh, 
knowing well the anxiety of Liverpool concerning the feeling 
prevailing there, sent this message: "You will probably wish 
to know my real opinion upon the sincerity of all that is passing 
around me. My opinion has always been that, whether sincere 
or not we ought to meet it as if it was ; . . . . but my belief 
is that the Emperor of Russia is, in the main, in earnest in 
what he says. ' ' 16 Castlereagh was persuaded that the Em- 
peror was, though desiring sway, intending to pursue a peace 
policy and to maintain his connection with the allies. 17 

England did not enter this conference with the hope of ac- 
complishing a great work; on the contrary, it was her purpose 

* Charles Stewart, minister to Austria. 

13 Ibid, XI, p. 1, (Castlereagh to Liverpool). 

14 Ibid, p. 2, (Liverpool to Castlereagh). 

15 Mettemich, Autobiography , Gentz Memoir, III, p. 191-2. 

16 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 47, (Castlereagh to Liverpool). 

17 Ibid, p. 48. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 23 

only to prevent innovations and to support the alliance with- 
out giving to it a new aspect. An English official stated that 
he did not expect much from Aix-la-Chapelle "except the ad- 
mission of France to the confederacy and the withdrawing of 
the troops from her frontier." 18 Fear of discussion of the 
work done in congress by the new Parliament which would con- 
vene in the winter, was the primary motive forcing England 
to take a conservative stand, to avoid secret protocols and to 
reject new treaties. 

The time and place for the first congress was made known 
through regular diplomatic channels. The intentions appear 
to have been to assemble early in September, but owing to the 
rise of the question concerning the admission of the Spanish 
King, the meeting was deferred several weeks. No definite date 
for the formal opening appears. There was apparently an un- 
derstanding that all should be present by the first of October. 
Wellington upon his arrival on September the twenty-seventh 
found the King of Prussia already there. Castlereagh and Rich- 
elieu had also arrived, and the Emperor of Russia was ex- 
pected the next day. 19 As in the congress of Vienna, the real 
work took place in private interviews, and for the most part 
the results were not written down. At the official conferences 
themselves no minutes were kept, and the documents which were 
to form the official reports were preserved in the form of 
protocols. 

The first work before the Powers, that for which they had 
assembled, was the substitution of a permanent policy toward 
France in place of the temporary measures that had been adop- 
ted in the Treaty of Paris. The Treaty contained an article 
providing that at the end of three years, the four allies to- 
gether with the King of France were to meet for the purpose of 
deciding whether the army of occupation should be withdrawn 
from France or whether the condition of that state was such 
as to necessitate its maintenance for a further period of five 
years. The three important questions to be settled were, there- 
fore, the evacuation of France, the pecuniary settlement, and 
the position of the French King in the European councils. 

18 Ibid, XI, p. 472, (Mr. Cooke to Lord Castlereagh). 

19 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, XII, p. 718, (Wellington to Gen. 
Count, Wocongon). 



24 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

That the troops would be withdrawn, and that some terms for 
a financial settlement would be made, and also that the King 
would be admitted, was generally understood. The point was 
to what extent the work would be carried. 

By October fifth, the work of the French settlement had so 
far progressed that it was certain evacuation would take place. 
Wellington began immediately the plan of withdrawal. Shipping 
of stores, transportation' of the English troops, mapping out of 
routes by which the different armies were to depart for their 
respective countries, all were supervised by Wellington. 20 A 
grand review of the troops before the sovereigns was planned, 
and necessary arrangements for the reception and entertain- 
ment of royalty were delegated to him. These military con- 
cerns occupied most of his time, and with the exception of very 
detailed work on the state of the finances, he had little part in 
the remaining business of the congress. 

On the first of October, Wellington reported to the ministers 
upon the financial arrangements. He declared that the French 
government was prepared by loans arranged with the bankers, 
Hope, Baring and Company to meet its obligations. 21 Calcula- 
tions had been made for the French by Monsieur Mounier, 
whose accounts later had been reviewed by Alexander Baring. 
Mr. Baring reported the method of calculation to be correct. 
The sum of ten millions of francs he considered fair as discount 
to France. A further allowance of thirty sous upon the price 
of the rentes to be given for the hundred million francs would 
be two million francs. The total debt amounted to two hun- 
dred and eighty millions. Allowing ten million for discount 
and two million for rentes, the amount of two hundred and 
sixty-eight millions, it was estimated would be the amount due 
the allies. It was proposed that this sum should be met in 
nine equal payments, "to be made the sixth of each month 
from January to September." The final statement was as 
follows : 



20 Ibid, XII, p. 725. 

21 Ibid, XII, p. 720, (Wellington to the ministers of the congress), 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 25 

"170,000,000 frs. by the French Treas. in drafts upon the 
two Houses. 
98,000,000 frs. by the two Houses for the purchase of 
Rentes for 100 millions less the reduction of 
30 sous. 



268,000,000 frs. 



England had in 1815 postponed her right to receive pay- 
ment until the second, third, fourth, and fifth years. As she 
had at this time demanded no compensation in interest, Well- 
ington held that she would demand none now. In the whole 
transaction, Great Britain, being the largest creditor, had more 
voice in the settlement than did her allies. The question of the 
cost to France of the maintenance of the army of occupation 
and the diminution of the indemnity in consequence of ex- 
penditures for the army having been greater than had been es- 
timated in 1815, complicated the settlement. The French minis- 
ters held that the allies ought to bear this cost. They claimed 
that according to the military convention of 1815, it was in- 
cumbent upon France to pay no more than one hundred and 
fifty millions of francs annually for the support of the army. 
This amount she had exceeded in the three years by thirty- 
eight thousand francs and consequently the demand was made 
that this amount be deducted from her debt. 23 

Wellington in his observations upon the demand admitted 
that it had not been anticipated in 1815 that it would be neces- 
sary for France to go beyond one hundred fifty millions. "If 
the allies had agreed to take this excess of expense upon them- 
selves, then the diminution of the army effected in April 1817, 
tended and all subsequent diminutions would have tended, to 
pecuniary benefit and relief of the allies themselves, and not 
of France, which is quite contrary to sense, reason, and fact. ' ,24 
This demand Wellington was unwilling to grant, but that France 
had a claim for interest for sums paid previous to the fifth 
year 1820, he admitted. 

In his memorandum, checking the accounts, and the claims 

22 Ibid, p. 724-5. 

23 Ibid, XII, pp. 726-9. 

24 Ibid, p. 729. 



26 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

brought forth by France, "Wellington was of inestimable value 
to England. His liberality toward France facilitated greatly a 
peaceable agreement. He was willing to allow France fifteen 
million francs as indemnity, basing this amount upon : 

"8 mill. frs. discount not due until 1819-1820. 
4 mill. frs. int. for sums paid by France on account of 

3 mill, for the solde in 1817-1818, due in 1820. 
3 mill. frs. for the solde of November 1818." 

The terms of final settlement as drawn up in the protocol of 
the ninth of October were based largely upon the two reports of 
Baring and Wellington. The agreement provided for the pay- 
ment of two hundred sixty-five million francs, of which sum 
one hundred million was payable by "inscriptions of rentes," 
bearing interest from the second of September, 1818. The one 
hundred sixty-five million remaining was to be paid in nine 
monthly installments commencing on the sixth of the following 
January, by bills on the bankers Hope, Baring and Company. 
Castlereagh objected to the confidence thus placed in the bank- 
ing houses. There appeared greater risk, he thought, in placing 
so great an amount of public money in private firms. The only 
safe-guard was their personal security, for according to the ar- 
rangement the allies did not even have the security of the 
French government. 25 

So great was the fear of Prussia of danger resulting from 
a falling of French rentes that her ministers demanded for 
themselves security from Baring and Company. To allay dis- 
trust, the demand had to be complied with. This caution on 
the part of Prussia seems justifiable, for within a few weeks 
of the settlement the public credit in France was severely 
shaken. Cash in the banks fell from one hundred seventeen 
million to thirty-seven million; the rente fell from seventy-six 
to seventy-one. 26 The great remittances abroad had taken the 
specie from the country. This, although merely a temporary 
crisis, made it necessary for the allies to alter the terms of 
the settlement. After the close of the congress, several of the 
ministers, therefore, went to Paris and there agreed, to keep 

25 Ibid, XII, p. 828. 

26 Ibid, XII, p. 763. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 27 

on deposit the inscriptions for the one hundred millions and 
to postpone the payment until the first of June 1820. 27 

The pecuniary settlement with France, though the most ted- 
ious business before the congress, was not considered the most 
difficult to handle. The difficulty of determining the method of 
inviting the King of France to participate in future congresses 
demanded more delicate treatment on the part of the allies. 
To a supplementary article of the Alliance recognizing France 
as an ally and openly declaring the Alliance no longer quad- 
ruple but quintuple, England would not consent. There was 
danger, the English thought, in giving a new character to the 
Alliance, and in risking the resentment of nations that were 
excluded. 28 Lord Bathurst wrote, "I should like it better if 
the invitation was given to any meetings which might take place, 
than say that the King was invited to become a part of the 
engagements to meet under the sixth article. ' ' 29 Toward the 
new treaty, England felt even greater anxiety. "We have 
been made very nervous," Liverpool wrote, "even by the pos- 
sibility of a new treaty to which France might be a party. ' ' 30 
The recognition of France as an ally, therefore, was not made 
by treaty, but by one of the protocols of the congress, a con- 
vention entered into by the plenipotentiaries of the four courts. 
In the third article, it was announced, that "France associated 
with the other powers by the restoration of the legitimate and 
constitutional monarchy, is engaged to concur from now on for 
the maintenance and establishment of a system which has given 
peace to Europe and which alone can assure the duration of 
it." 31 

Closely allied with this question was the determination of 
a method by which meetings in the future should be announced. 
Bathurst informed Castlereagh of the necessity of bearing con- 
stantly in mind the doubtful reception of an innovation by 
the English Parliament. "We were all more or less impressed 

27 British and Foreign State Papers, VI, p. 20. 

(Annex E) Arrangement definitely, pour regler le mode et les epoques de 
c' asquittement des derniers 100,000,000 de 1' indemnity Pecuniaire a 
fournir par la France. 

28 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 63, (Liverpool to Castlereagh). 

29 Ibid, p. 55, (Lord Bathurst to Castlereagh). 

30 Ibid, XII, p. 63, (Liverpool to Castlereagh). 

31 British and Foreign State Papers, VI, p. 15. 



28 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

with the apprehension of great inconvenience arising from a 
decision being now publicly announced of continued meetings 
at fixed points. ' ' 32 The whole cabinet was of the opinion that 
the time of the next meeting should be decided and announced, 
but that an announcement and statement of the same general 
purpose of such deliberation by circular letter should be avoided. 
Canning was the most emphatic of the cabinet members in de- 
nouncing a call by circular letter. There existed, he believed, 
no basis for such a proceeding. The ninth article of the Treaty, 
he construed as applicable only to a meeting called for the pur- 
pose of " watching the internal state of France as far as it may 
endanger the public tranquillity. ' ' 33 England won her point 
and in the protocol of November 15, it was announced that the 
powers which had concurred in the Act judged it necessary to 
establish definite assemblies. Let there be, it provided, "assem- 
blies among the august sovereigns themselves, or among their 
ministers and respective plenipotentiaries .... the time 
and place of their meetings will be each time previously ar- 
ranged by means of diplomatic communications. ' ' 34 

Besides acting in accordance with the principles of the Eng- 
lish cabinet, Castlereagh in the congress had to represent the 
English people in urging abolition of the slave trade. A pro- 
position had been made in the preceding February relating to 
the slavery question, and had been presented to the several 
ministers of the various countries. But previous to the meeting 
at Aix-la-Chapelle, no answer had been received. 35 At this 
time, to press the matter further, Castlereagh proposed mea- 
sures. Two particular propositions were submitted. 

The first provided for addressing a direct appeal on the part 
of the five Courts to the King of Portugal, founded upon the 
Declaration made in His Majesty's name by his Plenipotentiary 
at Vienna, and urging His Majesty to give effect to that declara- 
tion at the period fixed by Spain for final abolition, viz., on 
the 20th of May, 1820. 

32 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 55, (Bathurst to Castlereagh — Protocols 
de la conference entre les Plenipotentiaries des Cous d'Austriche, de France de la 
Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie — Aix-la-Chapelle, le 15 Novembre, 1818). 

33 Ibid, XII, p. 56. 

34 British and Foreign State Papers, (Protocole de la Conference entre les 
Plenipotentiaires des Cours, d'Austriche, de France, de la Grand Bretagne, de 
Prusse, et de Russe, Aix-la-Chapelle, le 15 Novembre, 1818). 

35 ibid, VIII, p. 299, VI, p. 26. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 29 

The second suggested that the Powers there represented should 
accept the principle of a qualified right of mutual visit, as 
adopted by the courts of Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal 
and the Netherlands, and should apply the same to the case of 
their respective flags, as circumstances might point out. 36 The 
votes on these points were unfavorable, and a request for ob- 
jections on the part of the different countries to the right of 
visit was complied with. Russia though approving of the prin- 
ciple of abolition, was reluctant to yield to the proposed measure. 
She looked forward to the final abolition on the part of Portugal, 
and in accordance with the visionary and idealistic dreams of 
the Emperor, formulated a plan for the creation of new institu- 
tions, to control the right of visit and execute the laws against 
piracy and other breaches of abolition. 37 ''The Russian Mem- 
oir," Castlereagh reported, "seems expressly to withhold, or 
rather to delay its adherence, until there is reason to presume 
that a general concurrence is attainable; but surely in all such 
cases the most certain mode of obtaining a general concurrence, 
is to augment the ranks of the concurring parties. ' ' 38 Austria 
also preferred to await universal abolition. 

France, unlike Russia, agreed with England that the right of 
visit as outlined in the English memorandum was no infrac- 
tion of the law of nations. She approved the principle of lim- 
iting ' ' exercise of this power to the immediate purpose for which 
it is granted," and the confining of the work to the African 
coasts. The objections were that, should she enter into such a 
measure, it might be looked upon as a concession for the evacua- 
tion of France; and further, that she could not approve of 
the principle of subjecting French property to the jurisdic- 
tion of authority other than her own tribunals. 

Prussia feared the abuse of the right of search and foresaw 
the possibility of molesting commerce in the open seas. Eng- 
land's purpose consequently failed for the time being. Why 
the Powers postponed the passage of such a measure until the 
slave trade should have been universally abolished, Castlereagh 
attempted to answer as follows: 

"Perhaps it is because no instance can be quoted that any 

36 ibid, VI, p. 57. 

37 Ibid, pp. 67-69. 

38 Ibid, p. 80. 



30 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

slave trader, under either the Russian, Prussian, or Austrian 
flags has yet appeared on the coast of Africa, that these Powers, 
from a sentiment of delicacy towards the States more directly 
interested both in the local and maritime question, have felt 
some reluctance to take a lead in giving the sanction to this 
principle. ' ' 39 

In addition to the disagreement on the slavery situation, dis- 
sent among the allies appeared in several other noteworthy in- 
stances. An act of guarantee brought forth by the Emperor 
Alexander and concurred in by the continental powers roused 
serious opposition on the part of the English emissaries. The 
act was concerned with a reciprocal safeguarding of possessions 
of each of the countries which were parties to the agreement. 
It proposed the establishment of the casus foederis "on a com- 
mon basis, against any extension, whatever, by one of the parties, 
of his present possessions." This guarantee was to apply to 
European possessions. The proposal met with the hearty ap- 
probation of Metternich who saw in it an advantage to both 
Austria and Prussia. Not so with the British Government, 
Metternich wrote, "who will find it impossible to take a direct 
and obligatory part in so extensive an act of guarantee." He 
believed, however, the proposition should not be rejected because 
of England's inability to accept it. His prophecy with regard 
to England's position proved correct. 40 

Liverpool, alarmed by such a suggestion, and fearing that "it 
would set the mind of Europe again afloat," urged the pre- 
vention of the act. "We cannot on any account be parties to 
any guarantee which may be maintained in it, . . . . we 
cannot enter into any new engagements. ' ' The situation present- 
ed a serious aspect to England, for the conclusion of this act 
which would supersede the Quadruple Alliance would neces- 
sitate her compliance with it, or her exclusion thereafter from 
continental affairs. 41 The general desire among the continental 
powers to hold England as an ally led to the rejection of the 
plan. 

Again, on another question England's objection carried 

39 Ibid, VI, p. 80, (Memorandum of the British Government). 
*o Metternich, Autobiography, III, p. 183. 

41 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, XII, p. 830, (Liverpool to Castle- 
reagh). 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 31 

weight. This concerned the Spanish situation, the question of 
mediation between Spain and the colonies. Liverpool was anx- 
ious that the point should not be urged by Spain, but as a pre- 
caution sent word to Castlereagh to bear in mind the interests 
of English commerce in his treatment of the matter. He men- 
tioned the distinction which England should maintain between 
the colonies of South America which had declared their indepen- 
dence formally and those which had not. With the colonies 
that had not yet made such a declaration, mediation could be 
permitted. 42 Since none of the Powers were desirous of under- 
taking the task of mediation an invitation was sent by the 
French and Russian ministers to the Duke of Wellington asking 
him to mediate. To him, the proposition seemed impracticable, 
as he considered that the Powers had no right to interfere unless 
requested by at least one of the parties implicated ; and still less 
would they have such a right should Spain refuse the right of 
intervention. He believed that little could be accomplished 
without perfect agreement on the subject among the Powers. As 
a consequence of his reply, no settlement of the Spanish trouble 
was made. 43 

England had successfully resisted the demands made by the 
allies in the congress for continued interferences in French 
affairs. She prevented the formation of a new alliance. She 
relegated the Spanish question to a position of unimportance. 
She opposed the summoning of congresses by circular letter. 
Work which it would seem should have found a place in the 
conferences, remained untouched. ' ' There was discussed neither 
the form of governments, nor the representative system, nor the 
maintenance or modification of the privileges of the nobility 
nor the liberty of the press, nor anything touching the interest 
of religion. ' ' 44 

There was reserve and timidity in the introduction of new 
questions on the part of all. The English cabinet in particular 
expressed uneasiness during the whole course of the proceed- 
ings. "You will be glad to find that there has not appeared 
the slightest disposition to push the discussion here beyond the 
line that had been chalked out by the circular from Paris, ' ' was 

42 Ibid, XII, p. 823, (Liverpool to Castlereagh). 

-tzibid, pp. 846-851. 

44 Metternich, Autobiography, Gentz Memoir, III, p. 195. 



32 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

a message to Liverpool from Castlereagh.. 4 ' 5 Knowing well 
that the foreign correspondence could be demanded in Parlia-. 
ment, both Castlereagh and the cabinet desired few papers to be 
drawn up. The real debates on the questions considered at Aix- 
la-Chapelle, they knew, would take place in the English Parlia- 
ment. For this reason, such warning as "I think it would be 
the safest thing to separate without any declaration, as we know 
how roughly these state papers are apt to be handled in Parlia- 
ment, ' ' 46 and ' ' the more general the declaration, the better, ' ' 
were among the expressions of Castlereagh of the anxiety pre- 
vailing in the Foreign Office. 

One of the greatest difficulties that the English experienced 
was the inability on the part of the allies to recognize the 
subservience of the Department of Foreign Affairs to Parliament. 
Liverpool, distressed by the Russian attempts to inveigle Castle- 
reagh, urged him to convince the Russians that the foreign ser- 
vice dared not be drawn into politics that would be at variance 
with the spirit of the government. 47 During the whole pro- 
cedure of the conferences, the ministers of Engiand in deciding 
upon the measures confronting them, had constantly to bear in 
mind the reception of their work at home. In the financial 
settlement, the question raised in Castlereagh 's mind was "How 
will such an arrangement be looked upon by the home govern- 
ment?" In his objections he urged not so much his own wish 
as the probable remonstrance of the home treasurer. "I do not 
believe that our Treasurer would trust so large a sum as four 
million of our treasury bills for sale out of their hands, upon 
any private security whatsoever," 48 was the note sent to 
Wellington. If the English diplomatists could have adopted 
a motto for their mode of procedure at Aix-la-Chapelle, it would 
certainly have been to this effect: Let us produce as few docu- 
ments as possible for the perusal and criticism of our Parlia- 
ment. 

So few were the important documents drawn up and the 
protocols entered into that a brief summary of the significant 

45 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 54, (Castlereagh to Liverpool). 

46 Ibid, p. 760. 

47 Ibid, XII, p. 63. 

48 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, XII, p. 760, (Castlereagh to Welling- 
ton). 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 33 

ones may be given here. The protocol of October ninth between 
France and Great Britain was the first essential agreement con- 
tracted. It provided for the evacuation of France, for the 
surrender of the fortresses, and for the payment of the French 
indemnity. The next fundamental convention, one which was 
of value for future work, was that of November fifteenth, signed 
by the four Powers, its chief terms being the provisions for the 
concurrence of the French King with the allies in future con- 
gresses and for the method of convening the Powers. The pro- 
tocol of November fourth, addressed to the Duke of Richelieu, 
announced the satisfaction felt on the part of Europe with the 
internal conditions of France and extended a formal invitation 
to the King of France to participate in future meetings. The 
two most noteworthy of the remaining agreements appear as 
annexes to other protocols. 49 One is a note of the French King 
in acknowledgement of the invitation; the other, a general 
declaration of the five Courts, on the principles which are to 
be upheld and which had been adhered to by the congresses. 
All of these documents with the exception of the one concern- 
ing financial settlement possess as their chief characteristic, very 
general statements. It is probable that in their last draft the 
English had the final word. The anxiety of Liverpool and 
Bat hurst must have been greatly relieved when they read the 
declarations in which little was contained of ''practical ques- 
tion" and which were more discussions as "to words than 
things. ' ' 

The work of the congress was concluded, and its results, un- 
foretold, were to be products of time. The real opinions of 
the participants concerning the value of the union of the chief 
European nations, in many instances, are probably, like the 
documents themselves, sentiments and expressions for the public 
to read. Castlereagh, guarded as he had necessarily been in 
every utterance and in every written argument, distrustful 
though he had been toward his allies, fearful though he had been 
of condemnation at home, yet declared: 

"It really appears to me to be a new discovery in the Euro- 
pean Government, at once extinguishing the cobwebs with which 
diplomacy obscures the horizon, bringing the whole bearing of 

49 British and Foreign State Papers, VI, pp. 14-21. 



34 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

the system into its ture light, and giving to the counsels of 
the great Powers the efficiency and almost the simplicity of a 
single state. ' ' 50 

Approving, as this statement seems to, of the system of con- 
gesses, it cannot be taken as proof of the desire to give any 
great amount of power to the congress. Before subsequent con- 
ferences were called, Castlereagh stated that with all respect 
to the work of Aix-la-Chapelle, he would ' ' question the prudence 
or in truth, the efficacy, of any formal exercise of its form and 
provisions. ' ' 51 

Gentz, in a memoir drawn up at Aix-la-Chapelle, affirmed that 
in his opinion the policy of holding a congress was best suited 
to European needs. As a conclusion to the meeting, his Memoir 
was read extolling the conference in its lofty idealism, in the 
harmony among its members, and in the delicacy with which 
the work was handled. Two great benefits, he proclaimed, in 
generalizations which would be inoffensive to a most exacting 
critic, result from the congress. 

"First, that of having entirely cleared the ground, removed 
all doubts, and fully re-established the confidence of each of 
the cabinets in the proceedings and principles of the others, 
and in the stability of the general harmony. 

"Secondly, that of having by confidential interviews, earnest 
discussions, and the contact of intelligent minds, imbued the 
sovereigns and their ministers with the necessity of maintain- 
ing intact a system which, whatever its theoretical merits or de- 
fects is at present the only one practicable — the anchor of sal- 
vation for Europe." 52 

Was the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle a success? The answer 
must be in the affirmative if we consider its result in relation to 
the purposes for which is was called, but in the light of the 
work which it might have done, like the congress of Vienna, it 
is found wanting. The slavery situation remained unsettled, 
and the Spanish difficulties, both colonial and domestic, were 
prolonged, to become considerations of a coming congress. 

Its chief importance lay in the establishment of a precedent 
for the reunion of sovereigns and ministers in accordance with 

50 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 55, (Castlereagh to Liverpool). 

51 Ibid, p. 312. 

52 Metternich, Autobiography, Gentz Memoir, III, p. 192. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 35 

the Quadruple Alliance. Furthermore, the beginning of a 
breach between England and her allies was forecast at this 
early date, for all Powers began to realize though vaguely, per- 
haps, that there existed in England a governmental power 
which would ever be looked upon by the English as superior to 
an international congress, a power to which all English policy 
must be bent. 



CHAPTER IV 
THE CONGRESS OF TROPPAU 

The period of 1820-1823 in the history of the Quadruple Alli- 
ance was marked by three important assemblies of the allied 
powers. It was the period of the Austrian congresses, as the 
conferences were rightly designated. All were held in Aus- 
trian territory; that of Troppau in Silesia in 1820; that of 
Laibach in Carniola in 1821 ; that of Verona in Venetia in 1823. 
For still another reason these congresses should be termed Aus- 
trian. In the case of Troppau and Laibach, it was a question in 
which Austria alone was vitally concerned, which led to their 
assembly. Verona saw the completion of Austrian interference 
in Italy. It was Austria that outlined the policy and saw to its 
execution. It was the period of supremacy of the Austrian re- 
actionary policy. 

The first formal meeting of the Quadruple Alliance took 
place at Troppau in November and December of 1820. Though 
the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had been held in 1818, it was 
specifically provided for by the treaty of Paris. That of Trop- 
pau, on the contrary, was the first congress to be called in ac- 
cordance with the general principles of the Quadruple Alliance, 
the principles declaring for the maintenance of peace and tran- 
quillity in Europe, and for the meetings of the sovereigns to 
consider together threatening evils and means of promoting the 
welfare of the European states. 

In 1820 and 1821 such events transpired within a few months 
as seemed to threaten the destruction of the old system. Revo- 
lution broke out in Spain, Portugal, Naples, and Piedmont. 
Prussia was on the verge of revolution. Military plots in prac- 
tically every state added to the anxiety of the monarchs. Met- 
ternich's theory seemed justified, that revolution was a con- 
tagion and that so long as a germ remained alive every state 
was in danger of contamination. With the spectacle of actual 

36 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 37 

revolution in progress, it was with little difficulty that Metter- 
nich secured the approval of the Emperor of Russia and the 
King of Prussia for a congress. 

To England, the expediency of a congress for the very evi- 
dent purpose of interfering with the internal affairs of a state 
was doubtful. In September, 1820, Castlereagh in a despatch 
to the British minister at Vienna wrote: 

"With all the respect and attachment which I feel for the 
system of the Alliance, as regulated by the transaction of Aix- 
la-Chapelle, I should much question the prudence, or, in truth, 
the efficacy, of any formal exercise of its forms and provisions 
on the present occasion when the danger springs from the in- 
ternal convulsions of independent states, the policy of hazard- 
ing such a step is much more questionable. ' ' 1 

Castlereagh was desirous that general questions should not 
be admitted if a congress convened. It seemed to him that 
Austria because of her proximity to the revolution in Italy 
should act independently of the Alliance and propose the course 
to be taken there. 2 In reply to the memoir of the Austrian 
minister calling for a conference to adopt a policy toward revo- 
lutionary Naples, Castlereagh stated his objections. He would 
not consent to the proposed hostile league of the five Powers 
against Naples. 

"If all are pledged not to recognize but with common con- 
sent the order of things now subsisting, that force, if requisite 
is to be employed for its overthrow, all are principles, not only 
morally but de jure in the war, though all may not bear arms 
in the execution of the common cause. Now this is a concert 
which the British government cannot enter into. ' ' 3 

This declaration of Castlereagh is a definite statement of a 
policy absolutely opposed to interference by the Alliance. It 
was a policy formulated by Castlereagh and forcefully main- 
tained and executed by his successor Canning. Against such 
a league, Castlereagh urged six objections of which the first 
and the last are particularly significant. It was a recognition of 
that same higher power that had been a check at Aix-la-Chap- 
elle. The first reason he stated for England's not entering into 

1 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 312, (Castlereagh, to Lord Stewart). 

2 Ibid, XII, p. 313. 

3 Ibid, p. 313. 



38 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

such an agreement was that "it binds to engagements which 
they could not be justified in taking without laying the whole 
before Parliament, ' ' and as if to emphasize the influence of this 
branch of government, the final summary of his objection de- 
nounced the league as "most certainly to be disapproved by 
our Parliament. ' ' 4 

The loss to English commerce was likewise reckoned with 
in coming to the decision that the Powers ought not to inter- 
fere. 

In the course of the despatch, Castlereagh made it clear 
that England's interference was out of the question, and that 
in the name of the Alliance, intervention was opposed; but to 
the propriety of Austria's interference, he would agree. "Aus- 
tria must, at least as far as we are concerned, make the measure, 
whatever it is, her own. ' ' 5 

From this attitude, Canning would have dissented, for he 
stood for non-interference on the part not only of the Alliance, 
but also on the part of any individual state in the internal af- 
fairs of another state. 

England had little interest in Italian affairs, and consequent- 
ly any hostile action taken by Austria against the Italian king- 
doms would affect her but slightly. A disinterested policy or 
one little forceful was, therefore, possible. With Spain, how- 
ever, her position was firmer. Russia and Austria had for 
some time been watching the development of liberalism in Spain, 
and had directed notes to England disclaiming the tendencies 
there. They had insinuated that England was secretly giving 
to the constitutionalists of Spain her approval, if not actual aid. 
Russia had proposed intervention. The ultra-royalists in France 
likewise feared the effects upon them of the overthrow of the 
Bourbon power in Spain. In April, 1820, Wellington, appre- 
hending the attitude of the European Powers, wrote to Castle- 
reagh, opposing any interference in Spain. The king, he said, 
had not called for assistance and it was doubtful whether it 
would be possible for the Powers to intervene at that time, 
pitted against each other as they appeared to be. But of this 
he was convinced, "No foreign power ought to interfere." 

4 Ibid, p. 314. 

5 Ibid, XII, p. 356. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 39 

' ' There is no country in Europe in the affairs of which foreign- 
ers can interfere with so little advantage as in those of Spain. 
There is no country in which foreigners are so much disliked and 
even despised." 6 

When the call for a congress came, therefore, England was 
prepared to resist any attack upon Spain. Austria had men- 
tioned particularly the Italian question as the significant one 
to be considered, and Castlereagh was anxious that the Emper- 
or of Russia should not attempt to introduce any new subject 
of discussion. Russia, as England had feared, did propose 
in the congress, intervention in Spain, but England vehement- 
ly protested. The Spanish question was then dropped. 

In September it was definitely arranged that the confer- 
ences would begin on October 20. The greatest concern was felt 
on the part of Metternich as to what England intended to do. 
In his memoirs, September 17, he wrote, "Will anyone come 
from London? and who? Castlereagh is desired by many, but 
he will not be able to come ; for this matter Wellington could be 
nominated. Will he come or will they choose to send him ? " 7 
Neither Castlereagh nor Wellington was sent to represent Eng- 
land. It was deemed sufficient to authorize Lord Stewart, the 
British minister to Vienna, to attend the congress and to look 
after English interests. 

Metternich found his strongest ally in the Emperor Alexan- 
der. "The Emperor Alexander has become much wiser than 
he was in 1813." After several private interviews, Metternich 
recorded in his diary, November 10, "The friendliness of the 
Russian Emperor for me continues. It is a return to the 
year 1813. If he had been in the year 1815 as he was in the 
year 1813, there would have been no 1820. " 8 The Russian 
policy because of the opposing views of the ministers and the 
Emperor was to Metternich an interesting object of observation. 
Nesselrode he could manage. "Nesselrode is morally dead; 
it is just as if he were not there at all." Capo d'Istria, how- 
ever, at one time the most influential advisor of the Emperor 
opposed the principles and policies of Metternich. He was 
England's strongest friend in the congress and Metternich 's 

6 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, I, pp. 116-117. 

7 Metternich, Autobiography, III, p. 393. 

8 Ibid, III, p. 402. 



40 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

most powerful opponent. 9 Metternich wrote he was a "small, 
mean, intellect," but one which must be made to turn even 
against his will. It was only after weeks of persuasion 
that Metternich forced the Emperor to cease depending upon 
his minister's opinions. The effect was to prolong the con- 
gress; November 27th, Metternich recorded his progress in the 
congress : 

"We are gradually attaining results. They are unhappily 
not successful to the degree I had wished ; with Capo d 'Istria it 
is even difficult to carry out a plain benefit. Capo d 'Istria is 
not a bad man, but honestly speaking he is a complete and 
thorough fool; a perfect miracle of wrong headedness. " 

Insignificant though England appeared in the congress, and 
strong as the unanimity seemed to be between the Emperors of 
Russia and Austria from being natural allies, England could 
still find in Austria a check against Russia, and in France 
likewise an ally against Russia. In the matter of Russian in- 
terference in the Greek revolution, it was early seen in the 
congress that Austria would view with suspicion and jealousy 
any move on the part of Russia in the southeast. Austria had 
been apprised of England's support in this matter previous 
to the meeting. With France, England had found a bond of 
sympathy, because of French fear that Russia would demand the 
entrance of a Russian army into Spain. 

As a result of the unofficial alliance, because it fostered 
strong tendencies ready to become active forces upon provoca- 
tion, neither the Spanish situation nor the Greek revolution 
dared be acted upon in the congress. The revolution of Naples, 
therefore, remained the only subject open to consideration. 

The congress opened with a statement by Austria of the con- 
ditions in Naples, and the urgent necessity of the allies to per- 
form their duty in restoring peace. It was unnecessary for 
England's representative to raise any objections, for both ob- 
jections and passive approval had been given to Austria in 
September preceding. Castlereagh had notified Lord Stewart 
that according to a strict interpretation of the Alliance the 
revolution in Naples did not come under its surveillance. "It 
is, nevertheless, an event of such great importance in itself 

9 Castlereagh, Correspondence , XII, p. 350. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 41 

and of such probable moral influence upon the social and pol- 
itical system of Europe, that, in the fortunate intimacy of 
counsel which prevails between the five principal Powers of 
Europe, it necessarily occupies their most anxious attention. ' ' 10 
This statement might be construed as an acceptance of the 
principle of interference by the Powers, but since it is con- 
tradictory to the opinions Castlereagh frequently expressed 
opposing the principle of intervention by the alliance, it is 
probable he meant to say that it was only natural that the 
Neapolitan revolution, an event of far-reaching effects, should 
be a subject of serious deliberation on the part of the Powers. 
It does not necessarily carry with it the idea that they were 
to interfere. 

England expected that Austria would interfere, but if force 
should be employed, she demanded that Austria satisfy the 
allies that she was aiming at no aggrandizement or supremacy in 
Italy, but that she was merely acting in self-defense. The stand 
for interference by the Powers having been taken, England 
no longer had ony voice in the congress. During the rest of 
the session there was no attempt made by England to oppose 
the course decided upon. It seemed to be the attitude that 
what was of no direct concern to England should be allowed to 
go on as it might. Castlereagh 's policy does not appear as 
straightforward as it might, and leaves a basis for opponents 
to suspect him of duplicity in the affair. Metternich was cer- 
tainly led to understand that Austrian interference in Italy 
would be tolerated, but that intervention by the Powers would 
be opposed in principle. But it was equally clear to Metter- 
nich that if the Powers did undertake to interfere, two courses 
were open to the English: one of withdrawing from the con- 
gress, and the other of resisting the Powers by arms. The sec- 
ond alternative would not be resorted to. Either Austria or 
the Powers, therefore, were free to act as they saw fit without 
fear of England. 

Very few documents were drawn up by the congress, but 
the few which were formulated show in the general sentiment 
expressed the absolute dictatorship of Metternich. He himself 
boastfully declared, "In all the documents sent forth the 

10 Ibid, XII, p. 315, (Castlereagh to Lord Stewart). 



42 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

thoughts are mine; but the drawing up is by Capo d'Istria." 
In loftiness of purpose, the objects proclaimed from Troppau 
are only secondary to the noble expressions of the Holy Alli- 
ance. The first declaration to the King of Sicily by the three 
kings was dated November 20th. Prefaced by several para- 
graphs dealing with the duty imposed upon the allies of restor- 
ing peace, the invitation to the King to join with them at Lai- 
bach was issued. 

Had it not been for the strong appeal of France that a 
reconciliation of the King of Naples with his subjects be under- 
taken by the allies, before recourse to arms was attempted, the 
meeting with King Ferdinand would most probably not have 
been proposed, and the congress of Laibach would have been 
rendered unnecessary. Although England and France did not 
sign the declarations drown up at the congress, or join with 
the three sovereigns in issuing the invitation to Naples, the 
King of France on December third sent a message to Naples, 
expressing his approval of the action taken by the congress, 
urging his attendance at Laibach, and regretting that he him- 
self was unable to be present. 12 

A second document of significance did not appear until De- 
cember eighth. It was this, the circular to the Austrian, 
Prussian, and Russian ministers at the court of London which 
led to the attack in the English Parliament on the foreign policy 
of Liverpool and Castlereagh. This circular is a statement 
of the policy adopted at Troppau. The sovereigns declared 
their intentions of repressing rebellion that opposed legitimate 
governments. Upon this principle, which they recognized as 
not a new one, but as one founded upon the principles laid down 
in the treaties of 1814 and 1815, they based the right of inter- 
vention. The inference was made that the courts of London and 
Paris would approve the proceeding. 13 

The opposition to the policy outlined in the circular, and 
to Castlereagh 's apparent approval of it, was led in the Eng- 
lish Parliament by Lord Holland and Earl Grey. The only 
evidence presented by Liverpool in defense of this attitude and 
as proof of his disapproval of the course taken, was his circu- 

12 British and Foreign State Papers, VIII, pp. 1147-1170. 

13 Ibid, pp. 1149-51. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 43 

lar letter from the foreign office to the British ministers at 
the foreign courts, dated January 19, 1821. Why England had 
not protested earlier against the principles of despotism laid 
down at Troppau was a question to which the English ministers 
failed to make a strong reply. The statement that the events 
of Troppau had been known in the latter part of December 
was a weak apology, for the policy prevailing at Troppau had 
been discussed in European papers long before this time, and 
England was certainly aware of the course that was being 
adopted at the congress. 14 

Both Liverpool and Castlereagh attempted to justify the 
allies somewhat by declaring before Parliament that the revo- 
lution in Naples was not a popular one, but that it had been 
the work of a military clique. In restoring the monarchy, 
therefore, the Powers were acting in accordance with the wishes 
of the populace. The English ministers preferred to look upon 
the interference in Naples as an exception, and not to admit it 
as the accepted policy of the Alliance. The general principles 
set forth by the sovereigns they strongly disclaimed. Liverpool 
declared, "Never did Russia, Austria, and Prussia do a more 
ill advised act, than when they put forth the declaration. ' ' 15 

In answer to the question, why England had not remonstra- 
ted against the work of the allies, Earl Liverpool without doubt 
touched the keynote of the policy England had adopted: "The 
country must not put itself into the situation of having made a 
vain remonstrance, which it has not the courage or the means 
to enforce. ' ' 16 

From this it would appear that the policy taken with regard 
to the conduct of the congress was based upon economic interest. 
The problems of whether England desired to maintain her 
neutrality with Naples, or whether she approved of restoring 
legitimate rule, or whether she resented the interference of the 
allies, all had to be answered not upon theories, sentiment, or 
precedent, but upon the basis of the advantages or disadvan- 
tages to her. Russia and Austria, it was known, had immense 
armies that could be put into the field upon a few weeks notice. 
A vehement remonstrance by England supported by arms would 

14 Hansard, Debates, V, p. 1061. 

15 Ibid, p. 1065. 

16 Ibid. 



44 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

have been necessary to make their opposition effective, and 
this was deemed inexpedient. There was nothing for England 
to gain. 

Having issued the invitation to the King and the circular to 
the foreign courts, the congress stood ready for adjournment. 
Instead, it was decided to await the answer of the King of 
Naples. This prolonged the meeting until the end of Decem- 
ber. Metternich on December 11th wrote, "The King of Naples 
may come or he may stay away; measures must be taken to 
suit both cases." The waiting was wearisome. Troppau was 
little accommodated to the entertainment of royalty, and the 
inclemency of the weather added to the disagreeableness of the 
surroundings. December 21st, Metternich recorded, "Still no 
news from Naples." At last on December 24th, the courier 
arrived bearing the news that the King would go to Laibach. 
"I start tomorrow morning, my Emperor; the next morning, 
the Emperor Alexander," on the 27th Metternich wrote. 17 

"Would England be present at Laibach? Metternich hoped 
she would join the allies there. "France and England have 
been asked to take part in the step, and it is to be expected 
that they will not refuse their consent, since the principle on 
which the invitation rests is in perfect harmony with the agree- 
ments formerly concluded by them." 18 



17 Wellington, Autobiography, III, pp. 406, 409. 

18 Ibid, p. 446. 



CHAPTER V 
THE CONGRESS AT LAIBACH 

When it was decided at Troppau that the congress should 
be continued, it was very wisely agreed to adjourn to Laibach, 
a city better suited to accommodate the members. Situated 
in southern Austrian territory, it was not an undesirable win- 
ering place. A winter resort it proved to be to the sovereigns 
and ministers of the congress, for with little to do but await 
developments in Naples, there was opportunity and leisure to 
enjoy the sunshine and soft winds, Italian in nature. 

The members began to assemble January fourth. Metter- 
nich, ever ready to seize the advantage of preliminary conver- 
sations and an opportunity of observing tendencies, was the first 
to arrive. A few days later, the Emperors of Austria and 
Russia, and the King of Naples were present. Their first meet- 
ing on January sixth Metternich dubbed the "Festival of the 
Three Kings." 

England's policy opposing the principle of interference in 
the name of the Alliance had not been changed, and consequent- 
ly Metternich 's hopes that England might send representa- 
tives to participate at Laibach were not realized. The Honor- 
able Robert Gordon was present, but since he was not officially 
accredited to the congress, did not attend the conferences. How- 
ever, toward the end of February, Austria was disposed to look 
with comparative complacence upon England's stand, and went 
so far as to invite the unofficial English representative into pri- 
vate conferences. 1 

France, after armed intervention was determined upon, re- 
fused to countenance the conferences. Any determined oppo- 
sition on her part would have aroused the indignation of Russia 
and Austria, both of which would have seen in such action, the 
old revolutionary spirit attempting to assert itself. Therefore, 

i Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 372. 

45 



46 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

to preserve her friendly relations with the European Powers, 
Prance had recourse only to silent disapproval and eventual 
withdrawal. 

The work of the congress commenced with a call upon King 
Ferdinand to declare his opinions concerning the revolution. 
As was expected, he implored the sovereigns to restore the old 
monarch and to establish the power of kingship as it had been 
previous to the events of 1820. Under the direction of the 
Powers, he framed a letter, January 20th, to his son, the Prince 
Regent of Sicily, informing him of the action of the congress. 

"I have found them irrevocably determined not to admit the 
state of things which had resulted from these events or which 
could result from them., to regard it as incompatible with the 
tranquillity of my realm, as well as with the security of neigh- 
boring states, and to combat it by force of arms, in the case 
where forces of persuasion could not effect an immediate ces- 
sation of them. ' ' 2 

The declaration of the allies themselves to Naples was trans- 
mitted by two circulars, dated January 19th, to the ministers 
of the three Powers residing at Naples. The conditions calling 
forth intervention were reviewed, and the general principles, so 
often proclaimed as the bases of their action, were again set 
forth. 3 The policy upon which the allies had agreed, was also 
declared. When the news reached Naples, the French charge d' 
affaires there addressed a note on February 9th, declaring that 
France would act in compliance with the instructions sent to 
the ministers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. 4 

The decision upon Sicilian affairs made at Laibach was made 
known to the Austrian people by a declaration issued by the 
Austrian government, February 13. Again the events in Naples 
necessitating action by the allies were developed in minute de- 
tail, and the marching of troops into the Italian province was 
announced to be a measure of greatest need. 

The congress in consequence, the report stated, had ordered 
troops to cross the Po, and if the conflict proved more severe 
than anticipated, the Russian Emperor stood prepared to join 
his forces with those of Austria. 5 



2 British and Foreign State Papers, VIII, pp. 116-23. 

3 Ibid, VIII, pp. 1165-1172. 

4 Ibid, p. 1172. 

5 Ibid, V, p. 1175, (Declaration of Austrian Government to Vienna). 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 47 

Neither the Austrian government nor the English felt content 
with this decree. The possible union of the great military power 
of Russia with that of Austria appeared to England to fore- 
bode grave dangers. There was no assurance that a compro- 
mise had not been effected by Russia whereby aid would be 
given Austria in Italy provided Austria in turn would give 
her consent to any Russian aggression in the East. To the Aus- 
trian government in Vienna and to the Austrian people, the 
mere proposal of a Russian army crossing Austrian territory 
was obnoxious. Capo d'Istria had opposed the declaration, 
but his influence had ceased to be of any consequence. 6 

February 6, the Austrian army numbering 60,000 men 
crossed into Italy. A proclamation dated February 27, and 
signed by Baron Frimont, General of the Austrian forces, was 
proclaimed to the Neapolitans, urging them to rally to the 
support of the King. The offensive was taken by the army on 
March fourth. Little resistance was offered and the army with- 
ing less than two weeks had entered Naples. 7 

On February 28th, the congress, having previously provided 
for another conference for September, 1822, dissolved. The 
King of Naples and the Italian princes accompanying him, left 
Laibach early in March, but the Austrian and Russian sover- 
eigns and diplomatists remained until late in May. From the 
adjournment in February, the formal sessions of the congress 
gave way to informal meetings, and the work accomplished after 
that date was in the nature of private interviews and agree- 
ments. 

Had it not been for the revolution in Piedmont, any arrange- 
ments entered into after February would have been treated best 
as unrelated to the Quadruple Alliance. But the interference of 
the Powers in the Sardinian kingdom, as a furtherance of the 
policy adopted toward Naples, must necessarily be associated 
with the work of the allies at Laibach. News of the insurrec- 
tion was received March 15th, and straightway an agreement 
was consummated between Austria and Russia by which 80,000 
men were to march from Austria into Italy, and 90,000 Russians 
were to cross the Austrian borders. 8 



6 Metternich, Autobiography, III, p. 480. 

7 Ibid, pp. 5190-5220. 

8 Ibid, III, p. 490. 



48 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

If England could have understood Metternich 's motives, as 
he recorded them, in demanding the mobilization of the Rus- 
sian army on the Austrian frontier, all suspicion of a secret 
compact between the Powers would have been dissipated. In 
reply to a letter condeming Austria's power in recognizing her 
inefficiency to cope with the revolutions of Italy and her ap- 
parent pleasure in receiving Russian aid, Metternich showed 
the artful cunning of diplomacy. 

"I had to think of destroying Russian Liberalism, and prov- 
ing to Europe that henceforth the Radicals will have to deal 
with the two powers possessing most freedom of action. 

"All the promises, all the speeches of the Emperor of Russia 
would have been valueless; but his setting in motion some hun- 
dred thousand men, their effective march, the expenditure on 
them of ten millions, these are facts. The command to halt is 
another fact not less important ; and a hundred twenty thousand 
men placed in the Russian provinces nearest to our frontiers, 
with orders to march at the first request of Austria, is certainly 
a third fact, which will prevent these disturbers from counting 
so rapidly on the Emperor Alexander in the future." 9 

From Laibach, the Italian rebellions were quelled ; the reac- 
tionary principles were supreme. Metternich tried to persuade 
himself that the Greek situation would settle itself, and a 
compact with respect to Greece was signed by the Emperors 
of Russia and Austria whereby it was agreed that, 

"As it (Greece) has remained up to this time estranged from 
all the affairs of Europe, we do not feel called upon to inter- 
fere in its affairs. ' ' 10 The Spanish question here as at Troppau 
was left untouched. 

The stand which England had taken at Troppau was main- 
tained at Laibach. At Troppau it was clearly shown that if 
interference were admitted, she would not become a party to 
the agreement, and at Laibach England let it be known that 
though she might dissent from the policy of the allies, remon- 
strance would not be made in the form of an ultimatum. Castle- 
reagh was determined that upon the Italian question, England 
should not take the field. England was apparently little con- 

9 Ibid, III, p. 529. 

10 Ibid, p. 523. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 49 

cerned with the events at Laibach, and made no arrangement 
for the rapid communication of information as in the preced- 
ing congresses. February 7, Castlereagh wrote, "We are yet 
without any intelligence from Laibach of the course of measure 
intended to be pursued. ' ' 1X 

Upon the question with whom England felt herself most 
strongly in accord, the views of the men of the period strangely 
differ. Since France opposed the course taken in the con- 
gresses, the natural supposition would be that France and 
England were in sympathy. Metternich, however, declared 
"France and England, far from being on good terms, com- 
pletely distrust each other. England is entirely with us. ' ' 12 

Others than Metternich were likewise of the opinion that 
England and Austria were agreed, and that as a matter of fact, 
England had, preceding the time of actual interference, taken 
more hostile measures against Naples, than had been adopted 
by the Congress. The presence of the British fleet at Naples 
was looked upon by them and by the opposition in Parliament 
as a breach of neutrality. Castlereagh affirmed that the pur- 
pose of the fleet was the defence of British citizens. With these 
conflicting statements the motive of the action must be left un- 
decided. 

In January, Castlereagh declared that Metternich should not 
have made the Italian revolution in Naples a European ques- 
tion, and in April before Parliament he stated, ' ' The illustrious 
monarchs have been ill-advised in adopting principles which 
were not consistent with sound policy." 13 Castlereagh dared 
go thus far in his replies to Parliament, but to have explained 
the real situation of England would have been impossible. No 
English minister would have had the courage to expose the 
weakness of British influence abroad, and to explain that war was 
her only effective recourse. Then to have explained further that 
intervention was tolerated because it was against England's 
economic interest to oppose by arms, would have degraded Brit- 
ish policy before the world. 

With the conclusion of the conferences at Laibach, Castle- 
reagh 's policy of the part England should take in the meetings 

11 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 364. 

12 Ibid, XII, p. 364. 

13 Ibid., p. 341. 



50 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

of the allies came to an end. At Aix-la-Chapelle the position of 
England had been one of force and prominence. On significant 
points her remonstrance had been effective. At Troppau and 
Laibach her disapproval of interference by the Powers was 
passed by unheeded. Castlereagh may have looked with less 
disfavor upon the proceedings than his public utterances and 
official correspondence indicated, but, nevertheless, in the fact 
that he had registered the remonstrance in his public acts is 
to be found the real importance of his attitude. The recog- 
nition that England must not interfere within a state, and that 
the economic interest of the nation forebade England's engaging 
in war to uphold a remonstrance upon a situation of little con- 
sequence to her, were Castlereagh 's chief contributions to Eng- 
land's foreign policy. In his policy, therefore, were laid the 
foundations of the inevitable disruption of a system governing 
Europe by congresses. When the point had been reached where 
accredited ministers would not be sent by England to the con- 
ferences a wide breach was effected; when action was taken 
based upon principles abhorrent to the English nature, the 
breach was widened, and when at last, English economic in- 
terests would be unfavorably affected by a congress, the allies 
and England would be found in opposing camps. 



CHAPTER VI 
THE CONGRESS OF VERONA 

In the few years between 1815 and 1822 there were without 
doubt more attempts made to unite the powers of Europe under 
treaties, alliances, and combinations for a common purpose than 
in any other correspondingly short period of peace. The Con- 
gress of Vienna, the Treaty of Paris, the Holy Alliance, and the 
Quadruple Alliance, the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Laibach, 
and Troppau, all suggested a union of the Powers, and a com- 
bination of federated interests. 

And yet, the summer preceding the conferences of Vienna 
and Verona found the European Powers widely separated in 
policies. The general alliance alone tended to unite the great 
nations. There was no federative system. Having settled the 
French situation, the Alliance was shorn of its only common 
purpose. The foreign relations of Europe were at this period 
in a state of transition. Attention had been turned from the 
French power, and statesmen were necessarily influenced by 
probable future developments rather than by present con- 
ditions. 

In this period of uncertainty, in which no Power could feel 
that it had the unequivocal support of an ally, intervention 
within the internal affairs of a state was admitted. It called 
forth denunciation on the part of Great Britain but did not 
provoke resistance. No federative policy had been combined 
and no demand of its assistance was made which the British 
Parliament would have been bound in the right of an existing 
treaty. Great Britain consequently, though vigilant in her 
watch of European affairs, refrained from interfering so far as 
her interests did not suffer. It was undoubtedly her policy to 
unite with no Power until the event or situation calling forth the 
federated interests of states should have developed. 

"Russia has long looked to the dismemberment of Turkey as 

51 



52 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

affording the opportunity of her own most valuable aggrandize- 
ment. Austria is eager to obtain possession of the Slavonian 
provinces bordering her own territories, and adjacent to Italy, 
her favorite object. France, connected with the Mediterranean 
and desirous of acquiring the advantage of commerce, looks with 
hope and expectation at the independence of Greece; and Great 
Britain interested generally in the protection of commerce, 
and specially in the maintenance of her own maritime impor- 
tance, must regard with anxious apprehension, every power 
which seeks to obtain a preponderance in a country so favor- 
ably situated for maritime purposes. Here, there is a country 
which Russia seeks to magnify in her already vast domain, and 
where Austria, France, and Great Britain have each a direct 
and urgent interest in restraining and moderating her en- 
croachments. ' ' x 

Perhaps this was to be the basis of a new federative policy. 
In 1822, it was still uncertain and the failure to agree in the 
Congress is traceable largely to the failure of diplomatists to 
foresee who the common enemy was to be; the danger from 
Russia being, however, the most zealously guarded. 

In the spring preceding the Congress of Verona, Metternich 
and the Marquis of Londonderry at a meeting in Germany 
discussed the Russian situation as related to the Greek revolu- 
tion and the Greek war with Turkey. They agreed that in 
the congress the Powers must not only refuse the intervention 
in the name of the Alliance, but must deny Russia the right 
of interference. It was definitely understood that the attention 
of Russia must be turned from the Southeast. 2 

Great Britain was alive to the approaching storm in Europe, 
and before the Congress had sounded Metternich on Austria's 
attitude toward Russia, and likewise through the Duke of Well- 
ington 's conferences with Monsieur de Villele, the French foreign 
minister, had attempted to determine the course France would 
adopt toward the Spanish revolution. Here Wellington agreed 
that the Spanish revolution was not a subject for the Congress 
as it was purely a French problem. 3 

1 Quarterly Review (1828), XXXVIII, p. 177. 

2 Wellington, Despatches, I, pp. 288-294, (Wellington to Canning in Paris, Sept. 
21, 1822). 

3 Ibid, I, p. 292. 

Chateaubriand, Congress de Verone I, Chapter XX. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 53 

From these two instances it may be seen that the Congress 
could not be a union of federated allies; the factions were 
doomed to be of greater importance than the combined Powers. 
Out of this discussion no two Powers were to be found whose 
interests were united on the various questions, such as the 
Turkish, the Spanish, the slave trade; there would have been 
formed the foundation of federative policies. 

The Congress of Verona, held in the fall of 1822, was not 
only the last of the series of Italian congresses, but whaft 
is of greater significance, the last union of the Powers in ac- 
cordance with the principles of the Quadruple Alliance. 

The instructions to Wellington to hold England aloof from 
interference within the internal affairs of any nation were 
first sent by Castlereagh in May, 1822. 4 The revolution in 
Spain was recognized as an evil tendency to be steadfastly 
watched by the allies; yet the opinion was advanced that there 
was no ground for believing Europe to be endangered by it. 
It was hoped that England and the allied countries in confer- 
ence would agree on the subject and realize that the purpose of 
the Alliance was not interference. With respect to Spain, 
Castlereagh wrote in the instructions, "There seems nothing to 
add to or vary, in the course of policy hitherto pursued. Solici- 
tude for the safety of the Royal Family, observance of our en- 
gagements with Portugal, and a rigid abstinence from any in- 
terference in the internal affairs of that country must be con- 
sidered as forming the basis of his Majesty's policy." 5 

In the Turkish question (the war between Greeks and Turks) 
Great Britain was instructed to be no party to intervention. 
Between Turkey and Russia the instruction declared it to be 
Great Britain's policy to insist upon the observance of treaties 
and to oppose any breach between the countries. On the sub- 
ject of the American colonies, England could join in no declara- 
tion affirming the rights of Spain. The purport of the instruc- 
tions was non-interference on the part of the Alliance. This, 
policy was retained and enforced by Canning. The credit, 
however, of declaring the principle is here seen to belong to 
Castlereagh. 

4 British and Foreign State Papers, X, p. 74. 

5 Wellington, Despatches, IV, p. 286, (Draft of Memorandum of Instruction for 
the Duke of Wellington ) . 



54 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

After his conservation with Villele in Paris, Wellington ap- 
plied to the new foreign minister, Canning, for any further 
instructions he might have. The reply gives due credit to the 
policy outlined by the Marquis of Londonderry. 

"On the affairs of Spain, whether European or American, I 
have nothing to communicate to your Grace which can in any 
degree vary the tenor of the sentiments expressed in the heads 
of instruction of which your Grace is already in possession, or 
of the conduct which your Grace is therein directed to ob- 
serve. ' ' 6 

Since the time of the instructions drafted by Londonderry, 
such occurrences had taken place in the diplomatic intercourse 
with the Powers as to suggest that without question, a deter- 
mined project of interference was afoot, and that at the Con- 
gress of Verona measures for action would be taken. Canning, 
therefore, reasserted the English position in a note to Welling- 
ton saying, "I am to instruct your Grace at once frankly and 
peremptorily to declare, that to any such interference, come 
what may, his majesty will not be a party." 7 

From time to time suggestions and semi-instructions appear 
in the communication from the British foreign office to Well- 
ington. They are not significant of any change in policy and 
so may be passed without comment. But because of the ques- 
tion often raised as to whether Austria would have been per- 
mitted to interfere in Italian affairs, had Canning then have 
been directing the English policy, a reference in his letter to 
Wellington is noteworthy, in which he refers to the question of 
Austria withdrawing her troops, one of the questions for 
discussion at the conferences of Verona. He shows no disap- 
proval of the Austrian occupation of the Italian territory. 
"Should it appear your Grace's conviction, that the con- 
tinuance of an Austrian garrison in Piedmont is still abso- 
lutely necessary, your Grace has only to keep yourself within 
the lines of your original instructions, and preserve an abso- 
lute silence in any discussion of Italian affairs. ' ' 8 

The work before the Congress of Verona in which Great 
Britain was to take the part of the unyielding opponent to the 

6 Ibid, I, p. 301, (Canning to Wellington). 

7 Ibid, p. 304. 

8 Ibid, II, p. 308, (Canning to Wellington). 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 55 

continental powers, was concerned chiefly with three questions: 
the Spanish situation, the abolition of the slave trade, and the 
policy to be adopted toward the Spanish American colonies. Of 
these, the Spanish question became the leading problem, and the 
one upon which the Alliance split into three parts. Early in 
the session, Wellington wrote to Canning, "It is obvious that 
the contest of Verona will fall principally upon me. Prince 
Metternich and Count Bernstorff will remain behind and leave 
to the French ministers and to me to fight the whole battle. ' ' 9 

As had been anticipated from the conversation between Well- 
ington and Villele, France brought forward the possibility of 
war with Spain. The army of observation maintained by France 
on the Spanish border, was objected to by Spain, French min- 
isters stated. But the protection of the French border demand- 
ed that it be retained there, was the French contention. The 
revolution in Spain was declared to be a menace to France and 
might necessitate war at any time. 

In view of this situation, Montmorency, the French plenipo- 
tentiary read a paper 10 before the Congress in which he repre- 
sented the situation as a purely French one. He desired, how- 
ever, the support of the Alliance in case of war and made three 
demands of the allies. First, what their attitude would be 
toward the situation, whether they would follow France in re- 
calling their ministers ; second, what moral aid they would give ; 
and third, what material aid they would guarantee. 11 Alexander, 
having surrendered his aggressive policy in the East, was anx- 
ious to employ his army in the West. It would tend to avert pop- 
ular disfavor at home with his policy toward Turkey. His 150,- 
000 troops were ready to march and it was his purpose to find 
use for them. At Vienna, therefore, before going to Verona, he 
had shown his readiness to march them into Piedmont through 
Germany, there to await developments in Spain, and to assist 
France if necessary. 12 

Metternich posing as a great friend to Alexander, in a half- 
hearted manner upheld the Russian offer in public meetings, 

9 Ibid, II, p. 348, (Wellington to Canning). 

10 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, I, p. 48. 

11 British and Foreign State Papers, X, p. 4, (Memorandum of the Duke of 
Wellington ) . 

12 Wellington, Despatches, I, p. 457, (Wellington to Canning). 



56 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

but secretly advised France to oppose it. 13 Wellington, the 
first of the ministers to reply to the French overtures, declared 
that Great Britain disapproved of any intervention or declara- 
tion by the allies against Spain, and that she looked with almost 
equal disfavor upon any rupture between France and Spain. 
Wellington reviewed the British line of conduct since April, 
1820, showing that it had been the policy of the government 
to avail itself of every opportunity of recommending to the alllies 
that they abstain from interference in Spain. England, Well- 
ington stated, would decline to engage in any measure on the 
hypothetical case as presented by Montmorency. 14 Before taking 
any action, is would be necessary for Great Britain to have 
knowledge of all the circumstances which had occurred between 
the two countries. 15 The three continental Powers in their sep- 
arate replies to the French paper were agreed that they would 
act as "France should, in respect to their ministers in Spain, 
and would give to France every countenance and assistance she 
should require ! the cause for such assistance, and the period and 
the mode of giving it, being reserved to be specified in a 
treaty." 16 

It was decided that despatches be written to the respective 
ministers of Madrid, in which the courts were to make known 
their wishes and intentions to Spain. Having failed to pre- 
vent the Congress from taking action on the Spanish question, 
and of course refusing to send a similar despatch to the British 
envoy at Madrid, Wellington recommended that the Powers 
confine themselves solely to the external quarrel between France 
and Spain, and that they suggest nothing with regard to the 
internal situation and that they do no menace. 17 Great Brit- 
ain then offered to mediate between France and Spain if France 
approved. 18 To France, however, Great Britain appeared an 
interested party, one not only in sympathy with the constitu- 
tionalists of Spain, but directly opposed to a strong Bourbon 

13 Ibid, p. 460. 

14 British and Foreign State Papers, X, p. 4, (Canning to Wellington). 
*« Ibid, p. 8. 

Wellington, Despatches, I, p. 506. 

16 British and Foreign State Papers, X, p. 9, (Memorandum of the Dnke of 
Wellington). 

17 Wellington, Despatches, I, p. 520, (Wellington to Canning). 

18 British Foreign and State Papers, X, p. 12, (Canning to Wellington). 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 57 

monarch in Spain, lest he be a source of strength to the French 
Bourbons. England had concluded treaties with Spain which 
aroused naturally enough the suspicions of France. Chateau- 
briand remarks that he learned from good authority that Eng- 
land had already given 2,000,000 to Spain to obtain what she 
wished, and that she had promised 4,000,000 more. 19 

In the offer of mediation sent to Spain, Great Britain declared 
her willingness to mediate provided Spain redress the griev- 
ances between them. 20 From this it would appear that Great 
Britain was acting not solely in the capacity of champion of 
liberty and non-intervention, but that her own interests were 
the basis of her policy. 

Again throughout the pages of the diplomacy of this period 
there are continually allusions to a war between France and 
England, if France invaded Spain. Should that occur, the 
opinion prevalent was that it would mean a continental war, a 
certain war with Russia, a necessary one with Austria, who 
would be forced to give France the assistance she promised at 
Verona. 21 In this condition the Spanish situation closed, with 
the allies in three groups: Great Britain absolutely opposed to 
war whether by the Alliance or by France ; France claiming it 
to be her war; Russia and Austria believing it to be concerned 
with the Alliance. 

The Spanish American situation was given little discussion 
in this Congress. The internal conditions in Spain were too 
entirely disrupted to authorize a discussion of returning the 
lost colonies to the king. Wellington made known to the allies 
that Great Britain would admit of no general discussion of the 
colonies, but that they must be considered in three groups, and 
that three distinctions must be maintained: 

"1 The territories within which the contest still 
subsists. 
2 The territories in which the struggle may be said 
to be over, and the possession become complete 
on the part of the local government. 



19 Chateaubriand, Congres de Yerone, I, p. 86. 

20 British and Foreign State Papers, X, p. 28. 

21 Wellington, Despatches, II, pp. 31-33, (Memorandum from Canning to Well- 
ington). 



58 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

3 The states in actual or in intended negotiation with 
old Spain." 22 

Chateaubriand, ignoring the distinctions made by Great Brit- 
ain, proposed in the Congress to extend the principle of inter- 
vention to the colonies and to help the king of Spain subdue 
them. No conclusions were reached. In light of future events, 
however, it may be fair to state that without declaring it, the 
allies understood that should this situation become more urgent, 
a congress could be assembled to deliberate upon Spanish Ameri- 
can affairs. 

At this Congress, as at Vienna and at Aix-la-Chapelle, the 
British minister was instructed to urge the allied powers to take 
active measures against the slave trade. Of the continental 
powers, France was the one most actively engaged in maritime 
pursuits, and so it was to France, England first put the ques- 
tion of abolition of the slave traffic. In Paris, Wellington ap- 
proached the French minister on this point. He was assured 
that the "King and the French government were sincerely anx- 
ious to put an end to this traffic, but that they could devise no 
measures which could have that effect which they could hope to 
prevail upon the chambers to adopt; that the measure so often 
recommended to their attention by the British ambassador at 
this court, that of attaching a peine infamante to the convic- 
tion of this crime would be inefficient if passed into a law. ' ' 23 

With this little encouragement to a solution of the evil prac- 
tice, the British potentiary carried the subject into he Con- 
gress. In the paper read before the assembly on the subject, 
Wellington denounced France very openly, declaring that he had 
positive proof that the great contraband trade was carried on 
under the protection of the French flag. 24 The reason being 
that "France is the only one of the great maritime powers of 
Europe whose government has not entered into the treaties which 
have been completed with His British Majesty for giving to 
certain of the ships of each of the contracting party, a limited 
power of search and capture of ships engaged in this horrible 
traffis. ' ' 25 Wellington proposed that arrangement be made for 

22 Ibid, I, p. 287, (Instructions to Wellington). 

23 Ibid, I, p. 295, (Wellington to Canning). 

24 Chateaubriand, Congris de Yirone, I, p. 34. 

25 British and Foreign State Papers, X, p. 96. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 59 

executing the existing law against the trade, or that a conven- 
tion be entered into by the Powers to prohibit the importation 
of foreign produce from slave trading colonies. This latter 
suggestions was denounced as striking particularly at Portugal. 
Portugal, it was claimed, had no representative at the Con- 
gress and had the right of having its case heard before such an 
agreement should be made. 

The suggestion of an executive council to punish offenders 
was repulsive to the French. "This according to the nature of 
governments is the judicial and legislative body that is called 
upon to decide it. " M Chateaubriand denied the charge that the 
French flag covered this illicit trade. He stated, "To retire the 
protection of the French flag from foreign individuals who make 
use of the flag to cover commerce in slaves is entirely just, but 
France has no need to prohibit that which it has never com- 
mitted." 27 

The French people were suspicious of England's apparently 
high moral purpose in urging the abolition. Chateaubriand says, 
"One must admire here the Christlike spirit, the progress of 
civilization, that has been made and continues increasing without 
ceasing; but it is a singular thing that this perseverance of the 
cabinet of Saint James has introduced in all the Congresses 
in the midst of questions most vital and of present interest, this 
question incidental and rambling, of the abolition of the trade 
in blacks. The English had sold their whites as slaves in 
America in a time as near ours as the time of Cromwell. The 
secret of these contradictions is to be found in the private in- 
terests and mercantile interests of England. This is necessary 
to understand in order not to be a dupe of a philanthropy so 
ardent and so lately evident. ' ' 28 

Ardent as Great Britain appeared in behalf of the negro trade 
she was unwilling to permit the alliance to declare the slave trade 
piracy lest it give the Powers too much authority. 29 In the end 
the Powers united in declaring the trade "abominable" and in 
declaring themselves ready to agree to measures judged "ex- 



26 Chateaubriand, Oongres de VSrone, I, p. 39. 

27 Ibid, p. 36. 

28 Ibid, I, p. 35. 

29 Wellington, Despatches, I, p. 334, (Canning to Wellington). 



60 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

ecutable" in order to assure the total abolition. It was more of 
a moral triumph than a practicable one. 30 

This was the last important problem to be brought before 
the Congress. The allies had failed to agree as a whole, and, 
as factions, had been unable to have common interest through- 
out. The congress closed with France heartily disliking Eng- 
land, not only because of the Spanish situation, but because of 
what she considered an absolutely selfish policy on the part of 
Great Britain in the slave trade. England had united with 
Austria in distrust of Russia, but Austria stood with France 
on the Spanish difficulties. No Power through these conferences 
was able to find an ally with whom she could be federated 
for a common purpose. 

The strength of the Quadruple Alliance was broken at Verona. 
The union failed to become a permanent federation. It may 
have been that it was doomed to failure because of its wrong 
foundation, a league of the strong against the weak, rather than 
a union of the weak against some formidable power. The su- 
perior power, the one which would menace continental Europe, 
could not yet be clearly foreseen. 



30 Chateaubriand, Congres de Yirone, I, pp. 34-109. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF ENGLISH DIPLO- 
MACY IN THE CONGRESS 

The course of English diplomacy in the period of the Con- 
gresses cannot be said to have been determined by any one fac- 
tor, the social, the political, or the economic. Each had its 
share in formulating the policy of the British ministers and rep- 
resentatives abroad. The force of public opinion as a moral 
force was certainly a direct impulse to the English diplomatists 
to secure the abolition of the slave trade; the recognition of 
responsibility to Parliament, the fear of entering into any re- 
lations which might strengthen the opposition and threaten the 
government at home, likewise had their effects, as political forces 
upon the European relations. Though to no one force may 
be attributed the sole motive power, yet it is possible for 
one to appear predominant. The purpose of this chapter will 
be to trace the economic force, as the predominant factor in 
determining England's foreign relations with the Quadruple 
Alliance. 

The years immediately following the peace were in England 
a period of universal distress. Trade and commerce were dis- 
organized, agriculture and industry had not yet evolved through 
the industrial and agricultural revolutions into the new sys- 
tem. Millions were unemployed, and to this great mass seek- 
ing a means of livelihood, there was added in 1815, 1816, and 
1817, another million, the discharged soldiers and sailors. The 
vast majority of England's working men were starving; even 
the employed were unable to subsist on the low wages and were 
forced to become recipients of ' ' poor relief. ' ' x 

Under such conditions the work of the government was not 
to provide primarily for the growth of England, nor to seek 
prestige abroad; it was not to uphold principles of democracy 

i Cambridge, Modern History, X, p. 574. 

61 



62 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

by the sword. This was the period in which home interests 
had first to be dealt with. The first duty of Parliament was, 
therefore, to establish the stability of the state. Peace had to 
be maintained at home, riots and all uprisings of the masses 
had to be quelled. The people had to be led gradually into new 
fields of industry. The discontented were eager for a demon- 
stration against capital and government, and must from the 
state's point of view be given as little opportunity as possible 
for opposition to the new policies. Parliament in its extreme 
caution and timidity was opposed to intertangling foreign rela- 
tions, such as might rouse the nation. In short, the interest with 
which Parliament watched negotiations abroad was due princi- 
pally to the economic condition at home. 

To trace the influence of economic conditions upon each act 
of the English ministers, or upon every subject considered in 
the congresses would be a work impossible as well as imprac- 
ticable. Such an influence must necessarily react on a move- 
ment, a policy, a general situation, rather than upon mere oc- 
currences, such as the admittance of the French King or his 
representatives to the congresses; it is with the former class that 
an attempt will be made to relate economic influence. To this 
belongs the part taken by England in the financial settlement 
at Aix-la-Chapelle, the opposition to interference in Spain, the 
stand of comparative indifference on the question of Naples and 
Piedmont, the position of the slave trade, the definite policy of 
non-interference in the Spanish American colonies, the policy 
of non-intervention towards the Greek revolution in its early 
stages. 

The financial depression resulting from the wars led to the 
cry for retrenchment by the Whigs. The immense national debt 
which had steadily accumulated within a few years amounted 
in 1815 to 861,000,000 pounds. In that year 74,000,000 pounds 
was raised by taxation alone. Even with the war taxes and the 
laying aside annually of a sinking fund of over £14,000,000, 2 
"the capital of the debt rose by much more than the difference 
between the amount of money borrowed and the amount ap- 
plied to the liquidation of old liabilities. ' ' 3 With peace restored 
and expenditures reduced, the people of all classes who had 

2 Spencer Walpole, History of England, I, p. 29. 

3 Walpole, History of England, I, p. 29. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 63 

been overwhelmed with war taxes for a quarter of a century, 
hoped to obtain relief. The plan of depending upon the sinking 
fund to liquidate the debt was doomed to failure, as "the 
scheme, in fact, depended on the surplus income of the country- 
being equal to the whole amount of the sinking fund, and, as 
the result proved, it rarely exceeded one-tenth of it. The plan, 
in a heavily taxed community, with constituencies clamoring for 
fiscal relief, was certain to fail. ' ' 4 

The financial situation in addition to the debt was further 
embarrassed by the currency situation. 5 With peace it was 
hoped that the hoarding of money which had resulted from the 
contraction of the currency and fall of prices would cease, and 
that money would no longer leave the country. In 1817-18, 
however, specie continued to be drawn from England in even 
greater amounts than during the last two years of the war. 
The deficient harvest of 1816 and the very ordinary one of 1817 
necessitated the importation of foreign grain; exports and 
imports fell off. Although France paid the expenses of the 
army of occupation, even then, large sums of English money 
were expended by the army. Subsidies paid by England to her 
allies during the war gave way to the first years of peace to 
loans. In 1816, France raised six million francs and again in 
1817 made provision for thirty millions raised in loans. The 
rates of exchange in these years began to be unfavorable to 
England, and in one of the debates on the currency situation the 
statement was made that: 

' ' If the committee would compare the dates of these loans with 
the periods at which the rate of exchange began to be unfavorable 
towards the country, it would be found to fall soon after the 
conclusion of the first French loan. ' ' 6 

As a result of this financial condition, secret treaties entered 
into by England were viewed with suspicion, lest they require 
money for their fulfillment. 

All the great nations were creditors to England. Through the 
great financial houses such as the Rothschilds and Baring, Eng- 
land had a most efficient organization for floating the loans. Not 
only the European countries but the Americas as well bor- 

4 Ibid, I, p. 30. 

5 Traill, Social England, VI, p. 89. 

6 Annual Register, (1818), p. 66. 



64 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

rowed from England. "Over ten millions were lent and lost in 
South America between 1822-26. " 7 

Until 1823 resumption of specie payments had not been made. 
In 1817-18, after long debates on the currency situation, Par- 
liament fixed rates at which notes were to be converted at a 
reduced premium until May of 1823, after which all notes were 
to be redeemed in gold. 8 In 1818 the statement was made official- 
ly that cash payment would probably not be resumed at the ap- 
pointed time, due not to any situation in the country itself but 
to "something in foreign relations." "What that something 
was," the Earl of Lauderdale stated, in an opposition speech, 
"he (the secretary of the Treasury) had not chosen to explain, 
but this much appeared that this most important of all measures 
no longer depended upon the decision of the British Parliament 
but on what might be done by the government of France or of 
any other foreign country. ' ' 9 

The foreign situation referred to was the approaching con- 
gress of Aix-la-Chapelle, in which the status of France was to 
be determined. If the armies of France were withdrawn, Par- 
liament foresaw France would want a further loan, and at the 
same time the government was concerned over the method which 
would be adopted to pay the present debt. 

In the congress of Aix, therefore, England drew up the con- 
ditions of the financial settlement. Being the biggest creditor 
not only of France but of the other Powers, England was left 
to arrange the settlement with France. It was as the banking 
houses of England would have demanded. Castlereagh, having 
in mind the situation of the currency in England, was worried 
during the congress as to whether the plan of payment to Hope, 
Baring and Company, a private firm, would be acceptable to 
the British Secretary. 

In the congresses succeeding that of Aix-la-Chapelle, the 
financial distress was ever a check in foreign relations. The 
congresses were looked upon as a needless expense, and at a time 
when the government was almost bankrupt, when taxes were 
excessive, even this unimportant item was denounced as needless 
extravagance. "The result of his ( Castlereagh 's) policy is this, 



7 Cambridge, Modern History, X, p. 743. 

8 Traill, Social England, VI, p. 89. 

9 Annual Register, (1818), pp. 17-18. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 65 

that we are mixed up in the affairs of the continent in a manner 
we have never been before which entails upon us endless nego- 
tiations and enormous expenses. ' ' 10 

The war, while incurring such expense upon England as to 
almost bankrupt the nation, at the same time developed the 
wealth of certain classes. Twenty years of war had destroyed 
European commerce but had raised Great Britain to the posi- 
tion of the greatest carrying power, the strongest commercial 
nation of the world. Great commercial houses sprang up to 
benefit from the new traffic suddenly thrown open to England. 
Rights of the European nations on the seas were ignored; the 
navigation acts of Spain limiting the trade with the Spanish 
West Indies had little weight in checking the British merchant- 
men. 

During the same period in which European industry was in- 
terrupted for lack of raw materials and was hampered by the 
late introduction of modern machinery, England was developing 
into the greatest industrial nation of the world. England and 
the Spanish American colonies became commercially supplemen- 
tary, the one, the producer of the manufactured commodity, 
the other, the producer of the raw material. Spain about 1808 
relaxed for a few years her navigation acts in favor of Great 
Britain, and from that moment, the colonies were lost to Spain 
commercially. 

The wealth, thus suddenly thrown to England in commerce 
and industry through the exigencies of war, easily made, was 
invested widely, often recklessly. Stock companies like the wild 
cat banks in our history sprang into existence overnight. Mil- 
lions of pounds were used for speculation in Spanish American 
mines. Portugal, for years a strong ally, almost a dependency 
of England, was infested with British capital. Even Greece, 
not yet an independent nation, opened a new field for British 
capital. 

As a result of this economic condition at home, the relations 
of England with foreign nations were naturally affected. With 
wealth acquired, the capitalist desired social and political posi- 
tion. He purchased a seat in Parliament and in that capacity 
denounced or approved the foreign policy. Though during the 



10 Greville, Memoirs, I, p. 55. 



66 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

period of the Congresses, the capitalist class was in a small mi- 
nority, its influence can be traced in foreign relations. It acted 
with the Tory party; it supported the landed interests, and its 
interests were in turn supported by the Tories. 

Such were the general conditions of England. The way in 
which they react upon the foreign relations will be seen in the 
policies adopted by the British ministers in dealing with the 
most significant problems confronting the congresses. 

In the intervention of Austria in Naples and Piedmont, Eng- 
land would remonstrate, but not forcibly oppose. English capi- 
tal was not invested in the Italian provinces to any considerable 
amount. Trade with Italy would be little affected whether the 
monarch were deposed or restored. 

Austria was determined upon intervention. She could speak 
with authority for, in addition to her own immense army, Rus- 
sia's several hundred thousand troops would assist if necessary. 
England financially was in no condition to oppose an aggres- 
sive policy within a state in which she was little concerned. 
Furthermore, there were military revolts in England at the 
time, and the loyal troops could not be spared abroad. The only 
efficient remonstrance would be by arms, and England was in 
no condition to maintain such a stand. Her statesmen could 
maintain such a principle, the principle of non-interference in 
this case. The formulation of the principle, however, did not 
necessarily mean that it would be maintained. 

In addition to the lack of funds, and to the general opinion 
that where England received no benefit, she should remain pas- 
sive, the effects of the French Revolution upon the European 
states, still clearly pictured in the English mind, tended to make 
the government conservative. 

Castlereagh shared the opinion of the Tories and of the 
Whigs who had temporarily joined them, that there was danger 
of revolution at home. He was not certain but that revolution 
in any state threatened the status of other nations. Although 
the government shared with the European powers this fear 
of revolution, with England the question of economic inter- 
est in cases of nation in revolution was first of all considered. 

When Spain asked for the aid of the Alliance to restore to 
her the revolting American colonies, England refused. ''The 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 67 

four allied powers and France had protested against the seizure 
of Monte Video, but otherwise Spain had been left to herself. 
Great Britain seemed to have more to gain than to lose by the 
insurrection. The revolted colonies were open to her commerce 
and by weakening Spain they had strengthened the maritime su- 
premacy of Great Britain. Great Britain was willing to mediate 
on condition that Spain would make reasonable concessions. ' ' " 
Spain was unwilling. 

England had for centuries suffered under the Spanish trade 
monopoly. If the colonies were reduced to Spanish authority, 
England feared the reenforcement of the old colonial system. 
Therefore, instead of upholding the principle of legitimacy, a 
policy of the alliance, English diplomatists yielded to the in- 
terests of their commercial classes. It was well known that 
agents in the colonies had raised loans and engaged soldiers in 
London, that regiments had left England to aid the insur- 
gents, that ships with cargoes of military stores cleared from 
Spanish American ports and that the mercantile interests favored 
revolution. 12 

In the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Castlereagh showed a 
comprehension of the English commercial interests in his state- 
ment, ' ' This reference to intervention in the colonies at once re- 
vives the whole colonial policy system, and even if it were 
sufficient to satisfy our interested views, it would reduce the 
colonies to that state of dependence upon the mother country to 
which it is impossible to presuppose that any of them will in 
the future submit. ' ' 14 The discussion in the Congresses of media- 
tion between Spain and her colonies, England prevented. But 
during these years British agents were attempting to negotiate 
a favorable commercial treaty with Spain. 15 From 1820 until 
the time of the independence of the colonies, the trade relations 
between Spain and Great Britain played a conspicuous part in 
the diplomatic relations. In a despatch of January 1820 to 
Castlereagh, Sir Henry Wellesley states, 

"Your lordship will see by my despatches that the Duke of 
San Fernando complains of the frequency of my representations 

li Brodrick and Fotheringham, 1811-37, Political History of England, p. 190. 
12 Cambridge, Modern History, X, pp. 213, 214. 

14 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 90. 

15 Wellington, Correspondence, I, p. 641. 



68 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

upon commercial subjects. In other respects we are upon very 
good terms. ' ' 16 

Suspicious that an attempt would be made to reconquer the 
colonies for Spain, after the invasion of Spain by France in 
1822, Canning entered into negotiations with the United States 
minister to London, Richard Rush, suggesting joint action against 
the European Alliance extending its powers to the American 
continent. The result was the Monroe Doctrine on the part of 
the United States and the recognition of the independence of 
the colonies a year later on the part of Great Britain. Canning 
realizing the commercial advantage to Great Britain made the 
remark, ' ' Spanish America is free, and if we do not mismanage 
our matters sadly, she is English. ' ' 16 

In urging the abolition of the slave trade, English represen- 
tatives were actuated without doubt more by the popular cry 
against slave traffic, and the demand for this social reform, than 
by economic motives, but in the minds of the European states- 
men, the proposals made at the various congresses for a gen- 
eral abolition were viewed in the light of England's self in- 
terest. 

France being the country most concerned in the abolition ques- 
tion, was the one England sought to win over to the cause. 
Three modes were proposed by Canning: persuasion, coercion, 
and interest. Of the means of coercion he mentioned the possi- 
bility of having the Alliance declare it piracy, but was perfectly 
confident France could not concede to British cruisers the right 
of visit and capture of the French ships. 17 Nor was Canning 
himself desirous that such a method should be put into prac- 
tice, it was a suggestion rather than a desired result. 

"As to letting the Holy Alliance declare it piracy, it would 
be to give them an authority, which they might turn to worse 
purposes." 18 

A second mode of coercion, suggested by Canning, was that 
of forbidding the importation of produce from the colonies of 
states permitting the slave trade. He was also quite certain 
that Europe would not accept. England, it is quite clear from 



i« Stapleton, Canning, p. 421. 
17 Wellington, Despatches, I, p. 325. 
18 Ibid, p. 334, (Canning to Wellington). 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 69 

the following note to Wilberforce, could not accede to such a 
proposition : 

"You are surprised that the Duke of Wellington has not 
been instructed to say that we will give up the trade with Brazil 
(for that is, I am afraid, the amount of giving up the export, 
of her sugar and cotton) if Austria, Russia, and Prussia will 
prohibit her produce. In fair reasoning we have a right to be 
surprised for we ought to be ready to make sacrifices when we 
ask them and I am for making them; but who dares to promise 
such a one as this, without full knowledge of the opinions of the 
commercial part of the nation " ? 20 

At Aix-la-Chapelle the plan of England met with counter 
proposals to which England could not accede. The Russian plan, 
for the establishment of an international board of control on 
the West coast of Africa with an international fleet, commis- 
sioned to suppress the trade, met with no success, neither did 
suggestions for the establishment of an international fleet in the 
Mediterranean against the Barbary pirates. 

"The sea power of Russia was a dangerous, because an un- 
known, quantity, the activities of the Czar's agents in Spain 
and Italy had excited the suspicions of his ultimate aims, and 
Great Britain refused to be a party to a plan which would have 
involved the establishment of Russian warships on the Mediter- 
ranean." 21 

In the Congress of Verona, England again pressed the subject 
of abolition. Here the failure to carry the measure was due, 
Canning states, "partly from the nations seduously inculcated 
by the powers having colonies that self-interest now mingles 
with our humanity and that by our persevering efforts to bring 
about the abolition in other countries, we are now seeking to 
inflict upon the colonial possessions of our rivals a portion of 
the evils which the partial abolition is alleged to have brought 
upon our own. ' ' 22 

England, instead of approaching the Congress upon this sub- 
ject, had the alternative of negotiating separately with different 
countries. This matter was, in fact, attempted in several cases, 
but the practice of purchasing the recognition of this evil by the 

20 Ibid., I, p. 475, (Canning to Wilberforce, Oct. 31, 1822). 

21 Cambridge, Modern History, X. p. 20. 

22 Wellington, Correspondence, I, p. 323. 



70 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

different countries entailed an expense upon the nation which 
was openly criticised. In 1818 Great Britain agreed to pay 
Spain 400,000 pounds, in consequence of Spain agreeing to 
the abolition of the trade. At this date, the suffering of the 
poor in England was intense, and the opinion was expressed in 
Parliament that the 400,000 pounds might be more advantage- 
ously disposed of in this country. It would furnish the means 
of giving to 8000 individuals the sum of 50 pounds each. 23 
Seeking foreign channels for benevolent purposes was looked up- 
on as false humanity. 

Abolition through single treaties was therefore impractical, 
and resort was had toward making it a general European ques- 
tion. Owing to the pressure at home for the suppression of the 
slave traffic, abolition was strongly advocated by England in 
the congresses. But the commercial interests of England were 
too much at variance with those of France to permit a final solu- 
tion of the problem. 

It was upon a situation of little importance itself, yet of 
greatest concern to England that the British policy so diverged 
from the European interests as to lead to the ultimate with- 
drawal of England's representatives from the conferences of the 
allied Powers. 

With the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy in 1820, Eng- 
land could hope for a liberal commercial agreement. When, 
therefore, at Verona, the Congress determined to intervene in 
behalf of monarchy, England's interests and those of her allies 
were in conflict. When neither side would yield the breach in 
the Quadruple Alliance was completed. 

When the Congress met, Metternich proposed a process verbal 
specifying the cases in which the powers should intervene, but 
the Duke flatly refused to subscribe. This was the end of the 
Congress. The differences between the Alliance and Great 
Britain were proclaimed to the world, and Canning wrote to 
Frere soon after, "The history of all I could tell in the words 
or rather in the substitution of one word for another, for "alli- 
ance" read "England" and you have the clue to my policy." 24 

The French armies were marched into Spain and the absolute 
monarchy was restored. England, though in the position of an 

23 Annual Register, (1818), I, pp. 20-22. 

24 Bagot, Canning, II, p. 120. 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 71 

indifferent by-stander, kept close watch. Just as in the Austrian 
intervention in Naples, the British warships appeared in the 
Bay of Naples with secret orders, and so at this time, the British 
fleet, always prepared, was stationed off the coast of Portugal 
with the ostensible purpose of preserving Portugal from foreign 
invasion and aggression. It was a country in which British in- 
vestments were to be protected. 

Of the important problems before the Congresses, there re- 
mains the Greek situation. In the Greek revolution, Russia for 
obvious reasons espoused the cause against Turkey. The Greeks 
were unquestionably deserving of the sympathy and aid of 
Europeans, which was denied them as a result of the action of 
the Congresses. But British commerce in the Black Sea was 
flourishing and commercial interests could permit of no inter- 
vention which might weaken that trade, or make Russia domi- 
nant in the Eastern waters. The apprehension of this danger 
is expressed by Wellington in a note to Canning dated at Verona. 

"I have explained to the Count (Nesselrode) that it was im- 
possible for Great Britain to adopt or to attempt to enforce 
upon the Porte the principle of making the Black Sea another 
Baltic, or of the Bosphorus a Sound. ' ' 25 The question united 
Austria and Great Britain, Great Britain agreeing with Metter- 
nich to let the revolution "burn itself out beyond the pale of 
civilization. ' ' 

Aside from the danger of Russian supremacy in the East, 
there was another reason for England's reticence to succor the 
Greek cause. 

' ' Should we be led by any false impulse of chivalrous benevo- 
lence to participate in the struggle itself, we commit, and there- 
by impair our authority; we abandon the position in which 
we might hereafter do most good, and may bring the danger 
of a foreign struggle home to our own shores, and to our own 
institutions. ' ' 26 

As late then as 1822, liberal ideas were discountenanced in 
England as forerunners of revolution. About five years later, 
however, the British fleet again loomed up in the waters of a 
country in revolt. English capital in Greece was in need of 
protection. 

25 Wellington, Correspondence, I, p. 523, (Wellington to Canning). 

26 Stapleton, George Canning and his Times, p. 368. 



72 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

With the failure of England to agree with her allies at Verona, 
England's representation in the councils of the Quadruple Alli- 
ance was at an end. She had entered the Alliance and had 
acceded to the government of Europe by congresses in the be- 
lief that English interests would suffer without representatives 
in the European councils to guard them. Emerging from the 
war as the greatest European power, England had reason to 
suppose she would dominate the Alliance as she had done the 
Powers against Napoleon. After Aix-la-Chapelle, her influence 
had passed, due largely to the new economic relations between 
herself and the European states. Her armies were no longer 
needed in Europe, her subsidies belonged to the war period. 
After 1818 there was little need of English loans. No longer 
did economic obligations necessitate a dependent attitude upon 
Great Britain. With economic independence secured, the Powers 
were at liberty to oppose British interests. 



CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY 

The Quadruple Alliance, though successful in maintaining 
peace between the great European Powers, was never a strong 
federation. It was essentially weak, and the power which it 
wielded over all Europe was never recognized by the smaller 
nations as legitimate. It was a dictatorship of the great Powers. 

Within the Alliance itself, the wielders of this usurped power 
failed to act in harmony through the congresses. And so from 
without and within it was ever threatened with disruption. Dur- 
ing the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle, the King of Sweden protest- 
ed against the action of this league; later the German states 
protested against the Carlbad Decrees, which they considered the 
work of the Alliance, and again after Verona there was a re- 
monstrance made by the King of Wiirtemberg. 

From the time of the first congress to the breach at Verona, 
it has been seen, the various Powers failed to agree or to act 
together on a common basis. Austria was interested chiefly in 
maintaining her supremacy in Italy and in supporting every- 
where the old regime. France, up to the Congress of Verona 
was chiefly concerned in reestablishing herself in the councils of 
the Powers, and from that time was interested in carrying out a 
national policy against Spain. Russia agreed with Austria that 
liberal tendencies must be thwarted, and England, ostensibly the 
champion of liberal movements and non-interference, opposed 
or tacitly acquiesced, depending as her commercial interests were 
involved. The Alliance from within, therefore, could only exist 
as long as the varied interests did not conflict. Each of the 
members found difficulty in supporting such an international 
alliance, organized on broad principles capable of unlimited 
expension. 

With the defection of England at Verona, the congresses held 
in accordance with the Alliance were discontinued, but the 

73 



74 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 

Quadruple Alliance itself was not at that time dissolved. Though 
its power in European politics was broken then, it existed in 
theory until 1848. 

After Verona, England's policy rapidly diverged from that 
of the continent and she gradually developed her policy of iso- 
lation or rather returned to it. Metternich wrote that the 
British government seemed to be devoting itself to a system 
of complete isolation but that he did not believe such a po- 
sition possible. Unquestionably, Canning's purpose after 
Verona was to hold England aloof from the continent. ' ' Hence- 
forward, England must be content to move steadily on in her 
own orbit. ' ' x 

Perhaps the chief purpose of the Alliance was the main- 
tenance of peace in Europe, not only between the Powers but 
within the individual states. In order to uphold the existing 
order, the Alliance adopted a policy of repression and succeeded 
in quelling liberal outbursts in Naples, Piedmont and Spain. In 
other states it checked such movements. The right to interfere 
was based upon the theory that if peace was to be maintained, 
order must be upheld; consequently revolution whether local 
or national must be thwarted as dangerous to the general peace. 
England, the most liberal member of the Alliance, though dis- 
approving of suppression in the name of the Powers, yet per- 
mitted it, and through the period of the congresses held the 
opinion that every European country was endangered by revo- 
lutions in a neighboring state. 

The primary purpose of the various uprisings of the period 
was the desire for reform and liberty. This progress was sup- 
pressed by the Alliance. But in spite of the power of the Alli- 
ance and its apparent success in supporting the old regime, the 
spirit of discontent smouldered for a few years and then burst 
forth in the revolutions of 1820, 1830, and 1848. The Alliance 
had succeeded in retarding for a time the social, political and 
economical development of Europe, but failed to check the in- 
evitable progress toward reform. 

The Alliance cannot be condemned for its repressive mea- 
sures when viewed in the light of a general peace. The results, 
however, must be branded as a failure, for through reactionary 



l Wellington, Despatches, II, p. 207, (Metternich to Wellington). 



ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 75 

measures making reform impossible, it invited resistance, in the 
form of revolution. 

Considering the situation in a broader aspect, one should ask 
himself whether the policy of the Quadruple Alliance was re- 
actionary because dominated by the narrow conservatism of 
Metternich, or whether after all in its policy it had not touched 
upon a more fundamental principle, namely, that any inter- 
national organization for the maintainence of peace either be- 
tween states or within the individual states would not of neces- 
sity be reactionary. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

PRIMARY SOURCES 

1. Despatches, Correspondence and Memorandum of the Field Marshal, 

the Duke of Wellington, edited by his son, the Duke of Wellington. 
8 Volumes. I, II, VI. 

2. Supplementary Despatches of the Field Marshal, the Duke of Welling- 

ton. 8 Volumes. X, XII. 

3. Letters and Despatches of Viscount Castlereagh, edited by the Marquis 

of Londonberry, 12 Volumes. IX-XII. 

4. British Foreign and State Papers. VI, VII, VIII. 

5. Hansard Debates. 

Old Series— XXXL, XXXII. 
New Series — V, VI. 

6. Autobiography of Prince Metternich, edited by Prince Richard Met- 

tenich. 5 Volumes. I-III. 

7. Greville Memoirs. A Journal of the Reign of King George IV and 

King William IV, and Queen Victoria, by the late Charles C. F. 
Greville. 8 Volumes. I. 

8. Augustus Granville Stapleton — George Canning and his Times. 

9. Hertslet, Sir E., Map of Europe by Treaty, I. 

10. Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, I, II. 

11. Quarterly Review, XXXVIII. 

SECONDARY SOURCES 

1. Bagot, Josceline: George Canning and his Friends. 2 Volumes. 

2. Maxwell, Sir Herbert: The Life of Wellington. 

3. Cambridge Modern History, IX-X. 

4. Phillips, W. Alison: Modern Europe 1815-1899. 

5. Seignobos, C. A.: Political History of Europe since 1814. 

6. Brodrick, G. C, and Fotheringham, F. K. : The Political History of 

England 1801-1837. 

7. Marriott, J. A. R. : England since Waterloo — in Oman, Political His- 

tory. 

8. Hazen, Charles Downer: Europe since 1815. 

9. Martineau, Harriet: A History of the Thirty Years Peace. 1816- 

1846. 4 Volumes. I. 

10. Spencer Walpole: History of England from 1815. 6 Volumes, I. 

11. Robinson, J. H. and Beard, C. A.: Modern Europe, Volume I. 

12. Fyffe, C. C: History of Modern Europe. 

76 



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